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Note
Implicit Bias in Child Welfare: Overcoming Intent
RAKESH BENIWAL
Albert Einstein said that "[we can't solve problems by using the same kind of
thinking we used when we created them. " In spite of the wisdom of this quote, the
field of child protection attempts to do just that-often couching seemingly new
initiatives within old business methods and ways of thinking. The result is a system
that disparately impacts people of color at every stage of child protection
intervention. To be sure, the system recognizes that these disproportionate
numbers exist. But what child protection agencies fail to appreciate is the impact
that implicit bias has upon these outcomes. The failure to fidly recognize this
precursor to disproportionality has the unintended effect of endorsing it. What is
more is that child protection is a field that implicates a fundamental right-
perhaps the most basic of all fundamental rights-the right to raise one's children.
This Note recognizes the incongruity that arises when a system is permitted to
exist that disparately impacts a fundamental right along racial lines. When state
actions threaten such important rights, the intent requirement traditionally
required to make out a constitutional disparate impact claim should be waived. By
acknowledging that child protection engages in constitutionally suspect disparate
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Implicit Bias in Child Welfare: Overcoming Intent
RAKESH BENIWAL
INTRODUCTION
It does not take much to recognize the pervasive force of race relations
in society today. From the Black Lives Matter movement, to the Supreme
Court's repeated forays into Affirmative Action plans, race is no less an
issue today than it was during the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
While the underlying issue has largely been the same throughout our
country's history-the treatment of the minority by the majority-race
relations today have a covert and systemic tone, making it a difficult issue
to evaluate, to comprehend, and, perhaps most important, to remedy.'
Thus, the current civil rights movement faces a significant challenge to
overcome the ills of racism. In hindsight, it was rather easy to identify a
practice in the Jim Crow South that needed remedying. A water-fountain or
bathroom designated "Whites Only" was an easy target. The readily
identifiable target says nothing of the difficulty in instilling a cultural shift
and wrestling power away from the majority. Still, at a minimum, the fact
that a target could be identified assured that the minority could at least
focus their attention. This is not the case when battling racially suspect,
implicit bias. Often, such behavior or comments go unnoticed2 or, more
problematically, are engrained in everyday life. Additionally, the status
quo is a powerful tool in governance,3 and changing the hearts and minds
* Rakesh Beniwal has over fifteen years of social work experience, with ten years in the child
welfare system. He has served in every stage of the child welfare model, from intake/investigations to
adoption-related services. Special thanks to Professors Anne C. Dailey and Peter Siegelman for their
guidance as well as my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review. Most notably, I would like to thank
my colleagues at the Department of Children and Families who toil endlessly every day for the less
fortunate. Special thanks to Ryan Williams for his invaluable guidance.
'See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV.
741, 741 (2005) (noting a similar dynamic in the difference between overt racism of the 1960s and the
unconscious bias of the present).
2 See, e.g., Ijeoma Oluo, Uncomfortable Fact: Hipster Racism is Often Well-intentioned,
GUARDIAN, (Feb. 13, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
/2015/feb/I3/hipster-racism-well-intentioned [https://perma.cc/8RL4-NA3M] (describing how overt
racism often elicits a negative reaction from society, whereas subtler forms of racism do not).
' For example, the defendant in McCleskey v. Kemp relied upon a study exhibiting disparate
impact in the imposition of the death penalty in the State of Georgia. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In particular,
the study "found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black
defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of
the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims." Id. at 287. Despite the disparate impact on blacks, the Court held that
of those who benefit from it is a difficult, if not insurmountable, task.
These issues are particularly true when the driver of racial disparity is
rooted in implicit bias.
Implicit biases are subtle thoughts that are activated involuntarily and,
thus, are beyond our awareness or control.4 They differ from stereotyping
because implicit biases are predominantly unconscious.' In and of itself,
implicit bias may be benign and can even be positive.6 However, when
these negative biases are the predicate for decision making, a problem
begins to take shape. Because of the unconscious nature of implicit bias, it
is virtually impossible to prove through direct evidence. It is only in the
resultant data that one can evaluate trends and postulate that implicit bias is
a factor in those trends. Often, the only measure of implicit bias is through
disproportionate results-the misrepresentation of an adversely affected
subgroup compared to the larger population.'
Implicit bias can take many forms and have a variety of impacts. Its
resultant disproportionality in housing, educational, and employment
opportunities is merely the starting point. In spite of the scope of the
impact to society, our system of laws is stuck in between evidentiary
requirements to combat the problem. Under a number of federal statutes, a
showing of intent is not required to establish disparate impact liability,"
providing some measure of remedy for the effects of implicit bias. Under
the Constitution, however, disparate impact liability requires a showing of
intent,' leaving implicit bias unchecked in an array of situations."o Indeed,
the study failed to "demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias." Id at 313; see also
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 4232600, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 13,
2015) (barring expert testimony on implicit bias in an employment disparate impact claim); Jones v.
Nat'l Council of YMCA, No..09 C 6437, 2013 WL 7046374, at * 9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2013) (striking
testimony of expert witness's evidence on implicit bias).
See, e.g., CHERYL STAATS ET AL., STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 14 (2016),
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/implicit-bias-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S69G-JXH8] (defining implicit bias as "[t]he attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding,
actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner").
s See id (noting that implicit bias is "[a]ctivated involuntarily, without awareness or intentional
control").
6 See id. (noting that implicit bias "[c]an be either positive or negative").
FRED WULCZYN & BRIDGETTE LERY, RACIAL DISPARITY IN FOSTER CARE ADMISSIONS 5
(2007), http://www.citizenreviewpanelsny.org/documents/chapin-halldocument.pdf [https://penna.cc/
B8CG-N6VH] ("Disproportionality arises whenever the proportion of one group in the comparison
population (i.e., foster children) is either proportionally larger (overrepresentation) or smaller
(underrepresentation) than the general population.").
SE g, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k) (2012) (Civil Rights Act of 1964).
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545, 550 (1967)) ("Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who alleges an equal
protection violation has the burden of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimination."');
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("We have never held that the constitutional standard
for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under
Title Vil, and we decline to do so today.").
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the Supreme Court appears to be recognizing the incongruity. In endorsing
the availability of disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act,
Justice Anthony Kennedy recently wrote,
Recognition of disparate-impact liability under the FHA also
plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent: It permits
plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised
animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.
In this way, disparate-impact liability may prevent segregated
housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert and
illicit stereotyping."
Implicit bias can pervade the culture and function of administrative
agencies as well. This is particularly evident when evaluating implicit bias
as a function of discretion,1 2 something agencies have no shortage of. 3
Discretion can act like a petri dish-the more discretion an entity with
power has, the more feasible it is for implicitly biased decision making to
foster disproportionate results. The chain of events is as follows: discretion
in the administrative function permits implicit bias to influence decision
making, which leads to disparate treatment, and, ultimately,
disproportionate results.14
This Note will evaluate this dynamic in the child welfare system.
Section I will describe the scope of the problem, including the underlying
disproportionate data, and the ways in which implicit bias is a precursor to
that data. Much of the literature makes note of the importance of "decision
points" in a Child Protection Services ("CPS") case. This Note takes on a
'0 See Kimberly Papillon, Clearing House Review: Pursing Racial Justice in The 21' Century, 47
J. OF POVERTY L. & POL'Y 178, 182-84 (2013) (arguing that the intent doctrine helps to foster implicit
bias).
" Tex. Dep't. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Projects, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522
(2015) (emphasis added).
12 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 (acknowledging that "the power to be lenient [also] is the
power to discriminate") (internal citation omitted); see also Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial
Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 374 (2007) (arguing
that social cognition research on implicit bias exhibits actors in the legal system may "unknowingly
misremember trial information in systematically biased ways"); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson,
The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
795, 805-22 (2012) (describing how implicit bias can pervade three primary areas of prosecutorial
discretion).
13 See, e.g., Autotote Enter., Inc. v. Conn. Div. of Special Revenue, 898 A.2d 141, 144 (Conn.
2006) (quoting Wood v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 784 A.2d 354, 360 (Conn. 2001)) ("'[A]n agency's
factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight. . . .'). For a state-by-
state survey concluding the vast majority of jurisdictions defer to state-agency statutory construction,
see Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their
Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, app. A (2008).
4 See WULCZYN & LERY, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that "[d]isparity means a lack of equality"
and thus "disproportionality . . . is a function of disparity in the entry and/or exit process [of a
system]").
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similar approach, but this Section will pay particular attention to the life of
a case in the Connecticut Department of Children and Families ("DCF").
What will become evident is that the volume of resources required to
stamp out the problem of implicit bias pales in comparison to the sheer
dearth of resources available.
In the context of child protection, the state-run administrative agency
finds itself at the crossroads between the fundamental right to parent one's
child (and perhaps for a child to be parented by her parents and/or kin), and
the right of the state to intervene when the health and safety of that child is
threatened. As will be demonstrated, this state right is mired with
opportunities for implicit bias to influence decision making. It is, however,
impossible to find evidence of systemic implicit bias through any means
other than the resultant data. Thus, the issue is locked in the dichotomy
between different types of disparate impact claims presently available-a
systemic problem that can be readily observed through data, but for which
proving the requisite intent is impossible. Section II will evaluate this
problem. In particular, this Note will argue that the Supreme Court should
approach disproportionality in CPS in the same way it approaches any
issue that curtails fundamental rights-with a more searching eye. As
noted, the Court's most recent foray into disparate impact suggests a
greater understanding of how implicit bias can be evidence of disparate
impact." Ultimately, the Section will argue that the intent requirement of a
disparate impact claim should be waived where such an important
fundamental right is involved.
A principal argument against the disproportionality observation is that
people of color are more likely to have the characteristics associated with
child maltreatment due to their underlying socioeconomic status ("SES").16
Section Ll will combat this argument by drawing upon the growing
recognition of the indigent as a discrete class, especially against such
" See Kenji Yoshino, The Court Acknowledges "Unconscious Prejudice," SLATE (June 25,
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and_politics/the breakfasttable/features/2015/
scotus roundup/supreme court_2015_thecourt acknowledges unconscious-prejudice.html [https://
perma.ccN3JB-YRHP] ("[T]he idea that disparate impact can be used to get at 'unconscious
prejudices' is ... an idea new to a Supreme Court majority opinion.").
" That is, a person of color is more likely to be poor, which makes them more likely to suffer
from the associated ills of poverty such as stress or drug use. See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial
Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L.
REv. 871, 900 (2009) (arguing black children are "disproportionately associated with a set of
characteristics that have been repeatedly found to be accurate predictors for child maltreatment ...
includ[ing] poverty, unemployment, single-parent status, substance abuse, and living in a significantly
disadvantaged neighborhood") (footnote omitted). This then results in greater degrees of maltreatment
of their children. See MARIA CANCIAN ET AL., THE EFFECT OF FAMILY INCOME ON RISK OF CHILD
MALTREATMENT 3 (Inst. of Res. & Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1385-10 2010),
http://www.irp.wisc.edul/publications//dps/pdfs/dpl38510.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2VM-QFAJ] (noting
that "child maltreatment risk is associated with various indicators of economic hardship . . . .") (internal
citations omitted).
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significant state action, and argue that the high Court should continue to
advance this protection within the context of CPS proceedings because of
the fundamental rights involved. As will be shown, it makes little
difference if the true culprit behind disproportionality in child welfare is
poverty because the Court has already suggested that the state is forbidden
from drawing distinctions that cast a dramatic burden upon the indigent.
The ultimate goal of this Note is not to define CPS as unconstitutional,
but to promote change within the system to combat this growing problem.
In that vein, Section III will argue for the acceptance of implicit bias as
part of the human condition. What is apparent is that, while there is no
universal remedy to combat implicit bias, ignoring the problem is not the
answer. The system needs to be more cognizant of the amount of discretion
involved in CPS, the way in which this discretion is ripe for the influence
of implicit bias, and the disproportionality that results. Alternatively, if the
culprit behind such pronounced disproportionality is SES, then the state
should be doing more to combat these underlying factors at their inception.
Regardless of one's position, it is clear that "[t]he data on race, foster care,'
disproportionality, and disparities indicate that something is out of balance
in the juvenile dependency system."I7 It is incumbent upon the same
system to provide the resources to fix it.
I. IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION OF
PEOPLE OF COLOR IN CONNECTICUT'S DCF
Child protection is a decidedly polarizing field. There are certainly
those cases at the margins where there can be little doubt that state
intervention is not only warranted but necessary. Cases with clear physical
or sexual abuse, gross negligence, or abandonment are easily discernable
as warranting intervention. These cases, however, are few and far between.
Often times, issues fall within a middle gray area. In such instances, it is
quite likely that CPS workers' biases pervade their assessments, whether or
not these biases are drawn along racial lines. One's own experience in
childhood, as a parent, or in life in general, invariably shapes how they
would approach a particular situation in the home of another." These
" Jesse Russell, Racial Disproportionality in Child Welfare: False Logic and Dangerous
Misunderstandings, 95 JUDICATURE 109, 115 (2011).
" For example, if a CPS worker grew up in a meticulously neat environment, they may be more
likely to condemn marginal environments. On the other hand, a worker that grew up in a less structured
environment may be more welcoming of the same home environment while conducting an assessment.
See JINA LEE ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE CHILD WELFARE,
EDUCATION, AND MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 2, http://youthlaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Implicit-Bias-in-Child-Welfare-Education-and-Mental-Health-Systems-
Literature-Review_061915.pdf [https://perma.cc/DME4-AE3Q] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (arguing
that "[d]epending on a decision-maker's perspective, the idea of 'abuse and neglect' can encompass a
range of experiences....").
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implicit biases can certainly take on a racial dimension. Moreover, some of
the "non-racial" biases-biases that a person may even be aware of-can
serve as a proxy for race, compounding the problem.
Consistent with much of the literature in the area,1 9 this Section
describes the main decision points in the average CPS case, but attempts to
discern some of the areas that are prone to bias. It is vital to recognize that
these different phases of a case are frequently handled by different
employees within the same system. Each employee making these
individualized decisions is not an automaton and thus brings his own
worldview and experience (or lack thereof) into the equation. Increased
exposure to people with authority to make insular decisions that affect the
end result increases the likelihood of bias being a contributor to that
result.20 While these decisions are subject to review, deference to the initial
assessment is, by and large, the accepted practice.
As will become apparent below, DCF does not accept the majority of
its referrals. When it does, it closes a lot of those referrals as being
unsubstantiated. Still, these decisions should be viewed along a continuum
with compounding effect. The more frequently a family receives a referral,
the more likely it is to be accepted; the more often it is accepted, the more
likely it is to be substantiated; the more often a family has allegations
substantiated, the more likely a case gets opened for services; and the more
often a case gets opened for services, the more likely a child ends up in
care. Add implicit bias at one or more of these stages, and a concerning
picture emerges.
A. The Referral
Exposure to Connecticut's DCF begins with a referral to the
Careline.21 In 2014, a black child was nearly twice as likely to be subject to
a Family Assessment Response ("FAR") 22 as his white counterpart.23 For
" E g, Marian S. Harris & Wanda Hackett, Decision Points in Child Welfare: An Action
Research Model to Address Disproportionality, 30 CHILD & YOUTH SERV. REV. 199 (2008).
2o This differs from the having many people contribute to a single decision, whereby some of the
biases can be mitigated through discourse. While there are some procedures at DCF that call for such
an approach, many do not. Compare CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD AND FAMILY
PERMANENCY TEAMING (CF-PT) PRACTICE GUIDE 5-7 (2014),
http://www.ct.gov/dcflib/dcf/policy/pdf/FinalPermanencyTeamingPracticeGuide_03042015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J873-CD6Q] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (describing a team decision-making approach
to case planning), with, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 57-60 (describing the insular nature of the
investigation component in CPS).
21 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101b (2016); see also CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
POLICY MANUAL 33-1 (2016) [hereinafter POLICY MANUAL], http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/
/view.asp?a=2639&Q-321 506 [https://perma.cc/59B4-YPZJ] (describing the DCF Careline).
22 See infra text accompanying notes 40-46 (describing FAR reports compared to investigations
in the context of a differential response system).
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the same year, a Hispanic/Latino child was 1.7 times as likely to be subject
to the same type of intervention. 24 In 2015, a black child was 2.9 times as
likely to be subject to an investigation, while a Hispanic/Latino child was
2.6 times as likely to suffer the same fate. 25
National data suggests a similar dynamic. Indeed, some studies posit
that similarly situated black families are overrepresented at about three
times the rate of their white counterparts in acceptance for investigation by
CPS.26
Reports have a multitude of sources, but can generally be divided into
two categories-community based reports 27 and those made by mandated
reporters. 28 The first category refers to reports that are made by community
members under no obligation to make such a report. The second refers to
individuals who are obligated by state statute to make reports.29 Mandated
reporters, however, tend to have experience with children and with the
child welfare system in general.30 This affords them the knowledge to ask
the child questions relevant to the report, which, in theory, creates more
reliable information. Still, there is no reason to presume that mandated
reporters are not subject to the same biases as everyone else.3 1
Though the Careline relies on a Structured Decision Making ("SDM")
tool to help make decisions,32 there are myriad ways in which bias can
influence the decision whether to accept a report, as evidenced by the sheer
volume of reports that are not accepted for intake.33 Writing for the Casey-
CSSP Alliance for Racial Equity in the Child Welfare System, Dr. Robert
B. Hill described a number of arbitrary factors-such as the report being
made in the winter or spring, or coming from a professional-that
23 CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, 2015 PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS tbl.3 (2015)
[hereinafter PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS], http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a-4456&Q=565274
[https://perma-cc/37V7-BEKF] (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). All references refer to the fiscal year.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3.
27 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-103 (2016).
28 Id. §7a-101b.
291d. §17a-101(a).
30 See id § 17a-101(b) (listing the professions that are defined as mandated reporters which
generally include all those that have consistent interactions with children, largely in a professional
capacity).
3' See Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 204 (describing an empirical study in which many of
these same stakeholders were found to exhibit implicit bias themselves).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 73-83 (describing several issues with the SDM tool and
opportunity for discretion and bias to enter into the SDM process).
33 In Connecticut, nearly 50% of the total calls to the Careline are screened out. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2014 12 (2016) [hereinafter
CHILD MALTREATMENT], http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VZ68-MVPW1.
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influence the likelihood of whether a report will ultimately be accepted.34
A level of discretion (and a potential for bias) begin at this early stage
because a Careline operator must decide whether to accept the report.
These decisions, often made under pressure and within a short time frame,
have the ingredients that could result in implicit bias. For example, studies
have shown that individuals make disparate decisions based on black-
sounding names alone.35 If such an effect were observed at the report
acceptance stage, the entire decision tree that follows is based upon skewed
data.
Several compelling, if dated, studies are suggestive of this dynamic
and illustrate the fact that people of color are more likely to be reported for
child maltreatment than white children. Dr. Hill describes situations in
which "both public and private hospitals overreport[] abuse and neglect
among blacks and underreport[] maltreatment among whites." 6 The
research also indicates that black women are more likely to be reported for
abuse when their newborns test positive for drugs at birth. Certainly such
women should be subjected to CPS intervention. However, if bias is
observed in reports that should be based on objective criteria for
acceptance, then it does not bode well for allegations that fall in a grey area
where acceptance is subject to discretion.
Upon acceptance, the reports are classified according to severity and a
response time is assigned, which governs how promptly the intake worker
must respond to the family.38 A report codified with a short response time
can create heightened tension in the responding worker and direct
outcomes. Noting the presence of a similar dynamic in the judicial branch,
the National Center for State Courts observed, "[d]ecision makers who are
rushed, stressed, distracted, or pressured are more likely to apply
stereotypes-recalling facts in ways biased by stereotypes and making
more stereotypic judgments-than decision makers whose cognitive
34 ROBERT B. HILL, SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ON DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE: AN
UPDATE 19 (2006). The only factor cited that gets to the merits of the report is its severity; the more
discretionary factors include the age of the child and whether the perpetrator was male. Id The research
also found race to be a strong predictor of acceptance. Id.
" See, e.g., Sendhil Mullainathan, Racial Bias, Even When We Have Good Intentions, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/upshot/the-measuring-sticks-of-racial-bias-
.html? r-0 [https://perma-ccNG58-A2BL] (describing the author's study in which rdsumds with
"stereotypically African-American names" were submitted to companies and received roughly 50%
fewer callbacks, as well as a number of other studies espousing similar results); Benjamin Edelman et
al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.
APPLIED ECON. (forthcoming) (describing a Harvard Business School study in which requests for
lodging through AirBnB were 16% less likely to be filled when solicited by distinctively black names).
3 HILL, supra note 34, at 18.
3 Id.
31 See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 21, at 34-4 (setting forth response times of two-hours, same-
day, twenty-four hours, and seventy-two hours, depending on the severity of the allegations).
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abilities are not similarly constrained." 3 9 Indeed, due to the incredible
demands placed upon the average CPS worker, this issue pervades the
endeavor from start to finish.
Connecticut, along with a number of other states, has adopted a
differential response model ("DRS")40 that is in line with the nationwide
trend.4 ' The system, however, presents an added level of discretion-and
with it, an increase in disproportionality. In DRS, a determination is made
by the Careline as to whether the report is of one of two types. The report
may either be found to be of: (1) a less severe nature, warranting only a
voluntary, Family Assessment Response ("FAR") track; or (2) of a more
severe nature, warranting an investigation track.4 2 It is important to note
that the voluntary track is just that-a family can decline assessment
before it even begins.4 3 However, Connecticut's system contains certain
"rule-outs" which require an investigation, regardless of the allegations.44
While there are some purely objective rule-outs such as a newborn or
mother testing positive for drugs, others are contingent upon exposure to
the DCF system itself, such as two or more substantiated investigations
within the last year, or a previous risk assessment of "high."45 These are
39 NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: STRATEGIES TO
REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS 4 (2012),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%/`2Oand/o20Racial%20Faimess/IB Strategies
033012.ashx [https://permacc/8YCG-7RXD]. The paper relies on a number of empirical studies to
come to the general conclusion that stressful situations increase the prevalence of implicit bias. Id.
' See Memorandum from Comm'r Susan 1. Hamilton, Conn. Dep't of Children & Families, to All
Staff (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.ct.gov/def/lib/dcf/drs/pdf/drs memo_092110.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZX8Y-MGAN] (announcing the establishment of the differential response model in Connecticut).
41 See id. (signifying the importance of DRS by stating that DRS has been instituted or is being
planned in twenty-four states); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S
BUREAU, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3 (2014) [hereinafter
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE], https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/differential-response.pdf [https://
perma-cc/MLF2-7AD8] ("Over the past two decades, more than two-thirds of all states across the
country have implemented or initiated plans for [Differential Response]"). This system, however, is not
without its critics. See, e.g., Daniel Heimpel & Elizabeth Bartholet, DCF Shifi Puts Children's Safety at
Risk, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 24, 2014), http://articles.courant.com/2014-01-24/news/hc-op-
dheimpel-connecticut-dcf-children-safety-at--20140124 _dcf-response-children [https://perma.cc/
WLZ3-628F] ("The state's reliance on an unproven money-saving system ... raises questions about
their safety and appears to contribute to worsening treatment of children under the supervision of
[DCF].").
4 See DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE, supra note 41, at 2 (describing the difference between an
"investigation,"" which is reserved for high-risk cases, and an "alternative response," which is"
reserved for low- and moderate-risk cases).
4 See Hamilton, supra note 40 (explaining that participation in DRS for families is voluntary).
* CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: A PROMISING APPROACH
TO SERVING CONNECTICUT'S CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 3
http://www.ct.gov/dcflib/dcf/drs/pdf/drs modeloverview.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KT6-7Y55]
(presenting fifteen examples of "exceptional circumstances" where DCF may investigate due to safety
and/or risk concerns).
45 Id For an explanation of how subjectivity can be imbued into a purportedly objective risk
assessment, see infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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problematic because if the underlying system is implicitly biased and
disparate impacts result, then utilizing past dispositions to make future
determinations becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. More concerning is the
fact that this decision can be made in the field as well, since a worker has
the option of switching the tracks to an investigation, 4 6 adding yet another
opportunity for bias to influence a decision. The practical effect is that if
families are repeatedly referred for a FAR, and decline or do not comply
with services, they are eventually placed on the investigation track.
B. The Intake
In 2015, black children who came to the attention of DCF were nearly
twice as likely to be substantiated as victims of abuse and/or neglect as
their white counterparts.4 7 Similarly, those children classified as
"Hispanic/Latino, Any Race" were 2.6 times as likely to be substantiated
victims, and the catch-all category of "Non-Hispanic, Other" were three
times as likely to be substantiated victims of abuse and/or neglect.48
These trends are reflected nationally. The United States Department of
Health and Human Services collects data submitted voluntarily by the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 4 9
Specifically, the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System
("NCANDS") collects "case-level data" for each report of alleged child
abuse and neglect, as well as the disposition of the CPS response.o Like
Connecticut," the two most prevalent dispositions are whether the
allegations are substantiated or unsubstantiated.52 Using overall child
population estimates released annually by the United States Census
Bureau, the NCANDS establishes rates of abuse or neglect per one
thousand children in the overall population." The study defines a victim
"as a child for whom the state determined at least one maltreatment was
substantiated or indicated, or the child received a disposition of alternative
response victim . .. includ[ing] a[ny] child who died of child abuse and/or
neglect."5 4 The aggregate national results indicate that CPS found black
children to be victimized at 15.3 per one thousand children, while white
children were subject to the same finding at just 8.4 per one thousand
* Id.; see also Hamilton, supra note 40.
4 PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.3.
4 Id.
49 CHILD MALTREAiMENT, supra note 33, at 3.
" PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 21, at 34-36 ("Upon completion of the field response, the
investigator shall . . . complete the investigation and make a determination, based upon reasonable
cause ... whether child abuse or neglect is substantiated or not substantiated .....
$2 CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 33, at 17.
" Id. at 27.
54 Id. at 21.
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children." Interestingly, the NCANDS data indicates that Hispanic
children are subject to a relatively similar rate of abuse and/or neglect as
white children at 8.8 per one thousand children. 5 6
The decision to substantiate allegations of abuse or neglect are rife
with opportunities for implicit, or even explicit, bias to influence decision
making. At the outset, one must be prepared to define what abuse and
neglect are, since the definition sets the standard for what is to follow.
Though a CPS agency may offer a sound definition,5 7 whether this is
actually perceived as abuse or neglect to the individual child is an
altogether different, and rather nebulous, question. This is different from
other social crimes. While one can argue over the legal label placed upon a
homicide (e.g., manslaughter, second-degree murder, or first-degree
murder), the effect is the same-there are not varying degrees of death
with varying impacts upon the victim. Death is death. Conversely, a
"spanking" to one child may be abuse, where the same action committed
against another may be discipline. Going without food for a day may be
neglect in one context (e.g., a substance-abusing parent failing to feed his
child), abuse in another (e.g., a parent depriving their child of food for
extended periods as a form of punishment), or a socio-economic issue in a
third (e.g., a loving parent who simply cannot afford a consistent meal).
The ambiguity of this underlying definition is problematic because it
requires discretion to resolve and becomes an incubator for bias. 9
Moreover, the demands of the average CPS worker's ever-increasing
caseload compound the problem because they contribute to an inadequate
assessment.o
" Id. at 23.
56 Id. But see LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 ("Latino children are disparately affected, since
Latino families are more likely to have a substantiated case than White counterparts. Cases involving
Latino children were also brought into the system more quickly, with less time devoted to assessment
from the time of referral to the time of substantiation.") (internal citations omitted).
5 See, e.g., POLICY MANUAL, supra note 21, at 34-2-7 ("A child may be found to have been
physical abused who: has been inflicted with physical injury or injuries other than by accidental means,
is in a condition which is the result of maltreatment such as, but not limited to, malnutrition, sexual
molestation, deprivation of necessities, emotional maltreatment or cruel punishment, and/or has injuries
at variance with the history given of them."). The policy goes on to a define neglect as a child who "has
been abandoned, is being denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally, or
morally, is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-
being, [or] has been abused." Id.
" See, e.g., id. (referencing abuse specifically, by adding that "[e]vidence must be ruled in after
accepting for the child's misbehavior, surrounding circumstances including the parent's motive; the
type of punishment administered; the amount of force utilized; the child's age, size, and ability to
understand the punishment.") (emphasis added).
11 See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that "[w]hen the basis for
judgment is somewhat vague (e.g. situations that call for discretion; cases that involve the application
of new, unfamiliar laws), biased judgments are more likely.").
' See id. at 4 (describing the relationship between pressurized decision making and implicit bias).
2017] 1033
A related issue in the investigation stage is the added subjectivity of
applying a set of facts to these definitions. A child's ability to recall facts
with any degree of certainty varies as a function of his age.61 Additionally,
much like the perception of the same incident may vary across children,
the perception of an incident may vary across CPS workers. For example,
appropriate discipline to one investigator may be abuse to another. To
recapitulate, these perceptions are inevitably shaped by one's own
experience, both as children and as parents. This discretion is a natural
outgrowth of the "reasonable cause to believe" standard espoused by
DCF.6 2 However, what is "reasonable cause" to one worker may not be
reasonable to another.
Perhaps the most impactful decision in this stage is the one that
follows. Connecticut maintains a Central Registry-a list of individuals
deemed too risky to be in contact with children. 63  Until 2005, a
substantiation carried with it automatic placement on the Central Registry.
Since that time, it is a separate decision that is made based on a number of
factors,64 but still subject to discretion. 5 Individuals placed on the Central
Registry are precluded from becoming foster parents in the future, both as
kin and non-kin.66 Additionally, these individuals are limited in terms of
what areas in which they may seek employment. 67 There is an avenue for
appeal, but oftentimes the individuals are placed on the registry well before
their appeal is heard. This can have the effect of depriving the alleged
perpetrator of significant rights with minimal due process. Moreover,
assuring the individual receives notice of the decision and their right to
61 See Duneesha De Alwis et al., Children's Higher Order Cognitive Abilities and the
Development of Secondary Memory, PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 4 (Oct. 2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2834651/ [https://perma.cc/Z22Z-4C8X] (describing
the results of a study exhibiting that the ability to recall improves significantly with age).
62 See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 21, at 34-2-2, 34-2-6.
63 See CONN. GEN. STAT § 17a-101k (2016) (describing DCF's statutory mandate to "maintain a
registry of . .. findings of abuse or neglect of children"). The statute charges the Department with
adopting regulations which "shall provide for the use of the registry on a twenty-four-hour daily basis
to prevent or discover abuse of children." Id.
6 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-101k-3(b) (describing a list of objective factors to consider when
determining whether to place an individual on the Central Registry).
6 See id. § 17a-101k-3(c) ("In all other cases in which the department substantiates abuse or
neglect by an individual responsible, and the individual is not recommended for entry on the central
registry pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the investigator shall review the case to determine
whether the individual responsible poses a risk to the health, safety and well-being of children and
should be listed on the central registry.").
' See id § 17a-145-152 (noting that a foster care license shall be denied to an individual who has
ever had an allegation of child abuse or neglect substantiated, the necessary predicate to Central
Registry placement).
61 Id § 17a-101k-15(c) ("As permitted by law, prospective employers . . . may request
background checks for any person . . . .").
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appeal is lacking at best."
Also apart from a decision to substantiate allegations of abuse or
neglect, is a decision as to whether a case shall be opened for further
ongoing services.6 Additionally, a worker may elect to transfer an
unsubstantiated case to community-based programs, or to open the case for
ongoing services if his perception of the underlying issues warrants such
an intervention.7 0 This latter standard is decidedly subjective and requires a
worker to determine whether, in his view, a particular family can benefit
from state intervention. The potential for arbitrary decision making under
such a standard is patent-and another place in which bias can exert great
influence. Compounding the issue is the fact that the decision governs how
much additional exposure a particular family has to CPS.7 1 Indeed, there is
a prevalent school of thought suggesting that this increased exposure may
be the cause of disproportionality in child welfare.72
Illustrative of this problem is one of the principal tools DCF has to
standardize these decisions-Structured Decision Making ("SDM")." This
results-based tool is made up of several components, which are applied at
various levels in the life of a case.74 Like all such tools, the "risk
assessment" component is subject to a discretionary override of one level."
Thus, a "low" risk case can become a "moderate" case at the
investigator/supervisor's discretion and subject a family, with no
" See, e.g., Frank v. Dep't of Children & Families, 94 A.3d 588, 607 (Conn. 2014) (holding the
statute defining abuse, read in conjunction with DCF's policy manual, is sufficient as notice of a
teacher's placement on the registry).
69 See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 21, at 34-3-6 ("Transfer to a DCF service unit is mandatory in
all cases in which abuse is substantiated, unless deemed inappropriate by the Program Supervisor.").
70 See id (noting that if the investigation is unsubstantiated the CPS worker must determine
whether to "[cilose the case, with or without referral for services to be provided by another state agency
or a community service provider[] or [t]ransfer to ongoing services if risk assessment indicates a
moderate to high risk of child maltreatment, or if the family could benefit from the services offered by
the Department.").
" See Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 202 (noting that children of color are more likely to be
exposed to the child welfare system).
72 See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 4 (describing a study which found that black children were
twice as likely to be placed in foster care in counties where black children comprised a small proportion
of the total population).
73 CONN. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, DEFINITIONS: "STRUCTURED DECISION MAKING,"
http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a=2534&Q=491276 [https://perma.cc/N7YD-7ETW] (last visited
Sept. 24, 2016) ("Structured Decision Making (SDMTM) is the current assessment model on which the
Connecticut Department of Children and Families bases its practice.").
7 For example, there are SDM tools that govern the decision whether to accept a report, whether
there is an imminent safety risk warranting removal of children, or whether to reunify children with
their family of origin. CHILDREN'S RESEARCH CTR., THE STRUCTURED DECISION MAKING MODEL: AN
EVIDENCED-BASED APPROACH TO HUMAN SERVICES 4, http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/
publication_pdf/2008_sdm book.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P9Q-9PF5] (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
" See id. at 10 (providing a template for the "risk assessment" tool adopted in a number of states,
including Connecticut).
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substantiated allegations, to the child welfare system. Since this tool
purports to be objective, this finding is particularly problematic because it
arbitrarily supports DCF's decision to open the case, even in the context of
any ensuing judicial proceedings.
Other jurisdictions have echoed this concern. During a visit to the
University of Southern California, California's CPS director, Phillip
Browning, expressed his dismay with SDM: "[i]t's a manual process. I was
really very disappointed in the ability of a worker to manipulate [SDM] in
any way they want to."76 This same dynamic is present in Connecticut. If a
worker views the family system in a way that is concerning to him, the tool
is malleable enough to support his concerns. As suggested above,7 7 some
of DCF's practices can be rather self-fulfilling in nature. This dynamic is
exacerbated by SDM: "[b]ecause these tools are products of research on
the actual experience of families previously reported to the agency, it is
possible to assess risk with a reasonably high degree of accuracy."78
However, if the previous actual experience itself was inundated with bias,
then these tools only serve to effectuate the bias.
Another problem with SDM is that the tools are not capacious enough
to capture the variety of scenarios that any family may face.79 Marie
Cohen, a former CPS worker in Washington, D.C.,so writes:
"[u]nfortunately, these SDM assessments rely on yes-or-no questions that
do not capture many important factors."si Similarly, Los Angeles social
worker Ruby Guillen describes an all too common problem in Connecticut:
"With [SDM's] yes or no approach, it does not differentiate between
domestic violence involving threats with deadly weapons and verbal
domestic disputes, or between a mother experiencing depression in the
wake of her husband's death and a mother suffering from schizophrenia
who refuses medication." 82 Faced with fitting a square peg into a round
hole, CPS workers are left making results-oriented decisions to complete
6 Holden Slattery, Social Worker, and Part-Time Hacker, Builds Apps for Child Welfare, CHRON.
OF Soc. CHANGE (July 21, 2015), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/news-2/social-worker-tumed-
hacker-builds-apps-for-child-welfare/ 1425 [https://perma.cc/A3DY-J9RJ].
" See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 (describing the self-fulfilling nature of DRS "rule-
outs" that are reliant upon previous exposure to DCF).
" CH[LDREN'S RESEARCH CTR., supra note 74, at 9.
7 See id ("[B]ecause they are research-based, risk assessments do not have to incorporate a
comprehensive list of every conceivable variable that might be related to outcomes.").
' Marie K. Cohen, The Shortcomings of Structured Decision Making, CHRON. OF Soc. CHANGE
(July 30, 2015), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/the-shortcomings-of-structured-decision
making/I 1539 [https://perma.cc/P54S-UWMF]. Cohen is also a former researcher at the United States
Government Accountability Office, the Welfare Information Network, the Center for Law and Social
Policy and the University of Maryland Welfare Reform Academy. Id.
8 11Id.
" Slattery, supra note 76. Guillen is a twenty-year veteran of social work and has assessed the
safety of over 6,000 children in their homes. Id.
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what often becomes a mundane task. That is, the SDM does not govern the
results, the results govern the SDM, and it becomes one of a long list of
tasks the social worker must complete to move the case along to the next
worker.83
C. Opened for Ongoing Services
In 2015, a black child was 1.8 times more likely than his white
counterpart to be the subject of a case for ongoing services. 84 A
Hispanic/Latino child was 2.5 times more likely to suffer the same fate,
and the catchall "other" category faced this disposition at three times the
rate as white children.s
Occasionally, a particular family refuses to accept services. There are a
number of reasons for this beyond that of the opinion of the social worker
making this decision. The family may truly require assistance but refuse to
succumb to the paternalistic notion of state oversight. More often,
however, cases are in a grey area-there are some concerns, but no
objectively clear indicators of abuse or neglect. The de facto rule for such
cases is to implement services. If a family objects and the perceived issues
continue, the case is referred to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters.8 6
However, these perceived issues need not be directly observed by CPS,
but, rather, can be based upon the observations of any service providers or
school-based personnel that have contact with the family and make
repeated referrals to DCF.87
When a case is considered ripe for judicial intervention, the DCF
social worker prepares a petition (commonly referred to as a "neglect
petition") and seeks either protective supervision or commitment. While
these petitions are subject to legal review, many of the staff attorneys are
subject to the same working conditions as the CPS line staff and thus are
prone to bias themselves. Moreover, these reviews are predicated upon the
facts presented. If these facts are skewed at the outset, legal review is little
more than a rubber stamp.
Protective supervision amounts to conditions set forth by the court,
3 See, e.g., id ("The [LA] county's Children's Special Investigation Unit reported in 2012 that
SDM can be manipulated to justify pre-determined outcomes or avoid higher-level review.").
m PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.3.
85 Id.
86 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129 (2015) (describing the authority of the Commissioner of DCF
or designee to "file with [the] Superior court that has venue over such matter a verified petition plainly
stating such facts as bring the child or youth within the jurisdiction of the court as neglected, uncared
for or abused . . . .").
" See supra text accompanying notes 27-30 (describing the variety of sources that can make a
referral to DCF).
88 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(j) (2016).
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which it (and, by proxy, DCF) monitors for a period,89 frequently six
months. In practice, however, these court-mandated expectations largely
mirror the expectations of DCF, and the impressions of the assigned social
worker and/or supervisor. Thus, the court largely gives judicial approval of
whatever implicit bias was imported into the case by a social worker.
Another feature that may promote this dynamic in Connecticut is the
system for the appointment of legal representation.9 0 There are often repeat
players:9 1 not only the attorneys, but many of the clients. Thus, an attorney
representing a client may have formed an opinion well before reading the
facts of a given case. Much like the child protection world in general, there
are certain cases at the margins in which an attorney will defend their
clients vigorously. But like any overworked, publicly appointed defender,
there are limits to this zealousness. Moreover, these attorneys are subject to
bias themselves.92 This serves to protect the status quo, and maintain any
underlying bias in the system that brings a case to the court system in the
first place.
D. The Removal
In 2015, black children were almost twice as likely to enter into DCF
care as their white counterparts.93 Hispanic children were three times as
likely to be removed, and the other category was over three times as likely
to suffer the same fate.94
The outlook is not much better on the national scale. Securing overall
population estimates from the United States Census and comparing it to
statistics on children entering state care, the Child Information Gateway
concluded that black children made up 31% of those in foster care, while
they only represent 14% of the total population. Interestingly, Hispanic
children make up 20% of foster children but 22% percent of the total child
89 Id
" See id § 46b-129(b) ("[A]n attorney will be appointed for parents who cannot afford an
attorney.").
9' See CoNN. VOICES FOR CHILDREN, PROVIDING QUALITY REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND
NEGLECTED CHILDREN I (Apr. 2008), http://www.ctvoices.org/sites//default//files/
welf08legalrepresent.pdf [https://perma-cc/8JLL-P33Y] (noting that Connecticut employs an
"independent contractor" model, with a total of "196 separate contracts" that provide representation for
children and parents in CPS proceedings).
92 See Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 209 ("'1 have a problem with any African American
male over the age of twelve,' was a statement from one court appointed attorney."). While the
statement itself is closer to an example of explicit bias, the fact that it was made in the context of a
focus group suggests that the attitude is more accurately described as implicit bias.
9 PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.3.
94 d.
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population. 95
Certainly there are instances in which the removal of a child appears
objectively necessary. In Connecticut, the Department will seek an order of
temporary custody in the first instance.96 However, should the matter be
too imminent, or occur during a time in which an ex parte order is not
possible (e.g., a weekend or after hours), the Department has the power to
invoke an administrative hold for ninety-six hours.97 During this period,
the Department is required to file for the order of temporary custody with
the court, or return the child.98 Agency deference results in many of the
administrative holds being accepted judicially. Once again, a major
decision point is left in the hands of the agency and, in essence, the
worker(s) involved. To be sure, an additional level of internal protection is
included since a manager is tasked with the "hold" decision. However, the
principal basis for this decision will always be rooted in the report of the
assigned worker, and to a lesser extent, the supervisor. This is because the
worker is tasked with gathering all relevant information and disseminating
it up the chain of command. How this information is gathered and
presented is within the discretion of the individual worker.
There is a rather perverse incentive at play in this decision. From a
practical standpoint, it is actually easier to remove a child from a marginal
situation, than endure the herculean effort of keeping a vulnerable child in
a home with a number of risk factors. Add in any underlying bias and it
becomes easy to see why the data is so skewed. Certainly there are CPS
workers who err on the side of caution and remove a child in the marginal
case. When considering children's well being, there is a body of support
for the idea that children have the right, beyond the rights of their parents,
to safety and well-being.99 Yet many children in marginal cases are not
removed."co This disparity illustrates the incredible amount of discretion in
9 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ADDRESSING DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE 3
(2011), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/racialdisproportionality.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RRX-
KDMW].
9 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(b) (2016) ("if it appears from the specific allegations of the
petition ... the child ... is in immediate physical danger from the child's or youth's surroundings, and
... as a result of said conditions, the child's or youth's safety is endangered and immediate removal
from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's or youth's safety, the court shall either (A)
issue an order to the parents .. . or (B) issue an order ex parte vesting the child's or youth's temporary
care and custody in a person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage or some other person or
suitable agency.").
" Id. § 17a-101g(e)-(f).
"Id. § 17a-101g(f).
99 See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REv. 741
(2016) (arguing that legal rules intended to protect children should not rely on what is best for children
alone, but take on a broader approach that considers the child's relationships).
" See, e.g., Josh Kovner, 2 DCF Workers Fired for Failing to Remove Children from Couple,
HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 5, 2016, 4:55 PM), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-dcf-
firings-willimantic-0406-20160405-story.html [https://perma.cc/75PB-TSTV] (describing a
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this decision that no current attempt at standardization can resolve. Though
there is post hoc judicial scrutiny, agency deference offers little in the way
of assurance that the agency is truly doing the right thing, and not suffering
from bias. Moreover, the judicial system itself is no stranger to the
phenomenon of implicit bias.' 0
In some ways, however, a biased removal decision may have been
made well before a case enters the ongoing services system. Utilizing
probabilities analysis, Jesse Russell, senior research associate at the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, established an
interesting concept. Extrapolating data from the 2005 National Survey of
Child and Adolescent well-being, Russell determined that the probability
that a black child will be placed in state care if a case is substantiated for
abuse or neglect to be 0.84, whereas the probability that a white child
whose allegations have been substantiated will end up in care is 0.61.102
Put differently, a black child who is determined to be a victim of abuse or
neglect is 38% more likely to be removed than his white counterpart.103
When considering all the potential bias that enters into the substantiation
decision alone,'04 the problem is quite telling.
E. The Long Road to Reunfication
Children of color tend to remain in care longer than their white
counterparts. While the data suggests that the overall length of stay in
foster care is declining for all populations,0 ' the length of stay for black
Connecticut CPS case in which two children, residing with a convicted sex-offender and an individual
on the state's Central Registry, were not removed until well into the case when the regional director
learned of the status).
0o See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 39, at 1 (describing the scope of the implicit
bias problem in the judicial context); PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.3 (indicating
that black children are 13.7 times more likely to be committed for delinquency than white children).
102 Russell, supra note 17, at 111. Russell utilizes Bayes' theorem to come to this conclusion
which is defined as "the probability of event A (e.g., rain tomorrow) given event B (e.g., the
weatherman forecasting rain) depends not only on the relationship between A and B (i.e., the accuracy
of the forecast) but [also] on the absolute probability of A independent of B (i.e., how much rain the
area gets normally)." Id.
03 id.
" See HILL, supra note 34, at 20 (noting that one of the factors that made substantiation more
likely was whether the family was black or Hispanic); see also supra text accompanying notes 47-62
(describing the disproportionate number of people of color subject to substantiation, coupled with the
many ways in which implicit bias can enter into the decision-making process).
05 See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN FOSTER 3 fig.3
(Sept. 2013), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/data-brieffoster_caretrendsl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M5F-3N8Z] (indicating that the average length of stay in foster care across all races
has decreased from an average of 31.3 months to 22.4 months from 2002 to 2012). But see CHILD
MALTREATMENT, supra note 33, at ii ("The national estimates of children who received an
investigation or alternative response increased 7.4 percent from 2010 (3,023,000) to 2014
(3,248,000).") (emphasis added). As result, the drop in overall length of stay may reverse course as
well. Indeed, other data sources support this notion. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE [NFO. GATEWAY,
1040 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW (Vol. 49:1021
IMPLICIT BIAS IN CHILD WELFARE: OVERCOMING INTENT
children tends to be longer. National data indicates that, as of 2012, a black
child's length of stay in care was twenty-nine months, while his white
counterparts exited care at around eighteen months.' 06
Upon removal, a parent has to rehabilitate within fifteen months or
face the prospects of a termination of parental rights petition.io' This is
inherently problematic for the CPS worker since he has to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the child,08 while at the same time seeking permanency
for the child. The former task entails a great deal of effort on the part of the
worker because he must refer the parents/guardians to services to address
whatever issues led to the removal in the first place; conversely, the latter
task may entail a completely different arrangement.1 09 Since the two goals
may not always be aligned, deft maneuvering by the worker is required.
Under such conditions, implicit bias can easily affect decision making.
When faced with two equally competing interests, how is one to decide
which path to take, without resorting to their own personal views? The
prevailing standard for such a determination is the "best interests of the
child.""0 Still, this inquiry is fraught with ample opportunity for subjective
FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2014 7 (Mar. 2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/foster.pdf
[https://permacc/7VK4-ACMW] (reporting a median increase from fiscal year 2005 of twelve months
in care to fiscal year 2014 of 13.3 months in care).
101 DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 105, at 4 fig.3.
107 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-l I la(a) (2016) ("The Commissioner of Children and Families shall
file a petition to terminate parental rights pursuant to section 17a-l 12 if. . . the child has been in the
custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen consecutive months, or at least fifteen months during
the [preceding] twenty-two months. . . .").
.o. Id. § 17a-l I lb(a) ("The Commissioner of Children and Families Shall make reasonable efforts
to reunify a parent with a child. . . .").
0o' Compare CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE OR
REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN I (Mar. 2016),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/reunify.pdf [https://perma.cc/47F--4AGS] ("Generally, these
[reasonable] efforts consist of accessible, available, and culturally appropriate services that are
designed to improve the capacity of families to provide safe and stable homes for their children. These
services may include family therapy, parenting classes, drug and alcohol abuse treatment, respite care,
parent support groups, and home visiting programs. Some commonly used terms associated with
reasonable efforts include 'family reunification,' 'family preservation,' 'family support,' and
'preventive services."'), with id. at 2 ("In many States, the statutes also require that when a court
determines that family reunification is not in the best interests of the child, efforts be made to finalize
another permanent placement for the child. Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA), while reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families are still required, the child's health
and safety constitute the paramount concern in determining the extent to which reasonable efforts
should be made.").
"" See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-1lla(b) (2016) (noting the exception to the filing of a
termination petition is "a compelling reason to believe that filing such petition is not in the best interest
of the child"); id § 17a-l I lb(d) ("If the court determines that reasonable efforts to reunify the parent
with the child are not required the Department of Children and Families shall use its best efforts to
maintain the child in the initial out-of-home placement, provided the department determines that such
placement is in the best interests of the child . . . ."); see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 2 (2013),
https://www.childwelfare.gov//pubpdfs/groundtermin.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PP2-L9V9] ("When
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analysis on any level."'
To complicate matters further, research consistently indicates that the
rehabilitative services available to families of color are significantly
deficient and they are the strongest contributor to disproportionate numbers
of children in foster care.112 This is even true when controlling for poverty;
and though black parents are more likely to be in drug treatment, the
services are found to be less adequate." 3 The same holds true for mental
health services.11 4 in concert, a person of color is more likely to have their
child removed, and then more likely to face a more arduous journey in
getting the child back.
In many ways, the length-of-stay metric is the culmination of a
deficient system. In the first instance, DCF is mandated to try and locate a
viable family for a child who comes into care."s In a vacuum, this is a
noble and proper endeavor with the most potential for a positive outcome,
and one for which this Note ultimately argues. Longitudinal studies
suggest that children placed with kin develop into healthier adults." 6
However, if a family of color is more likely to receive a report,"l 7 more
likely to have the report accepted when received,"' more likely to be
substantiated when investigated,"l 9 and more likely to have a child
addressing whether parental rights should be terminated involuntarily, most States require that a court.
[dietermine whether severing the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.").
". See, e.g., Hanke v. Hanke, 615 A.2d 1205, 1209, 1209 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)
(reversing trial court's decision to grant overnight visitation with the child's biological father in spite of
the fact that he admitted to sexually abusing his step-daughter; the appellate court noted "[i]t [was]
obvious that the trial court was annoyed because Ms. Hanke moved to Kentucky and was unwilling to
allow visitation" and "[iut [was] also clear from reading the record that the trial judge had no particular
fondness for Ms. Hanke's attorney.").
112 See, e.g, Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 202 (noting that children of color and their
parents receive fewer, and poorer quality, service providers).
11 3 Id.
114 Id.
"' See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(c) (2016) ("The preliminary hearing on the order of
temporary custody . . . shall be held in order for the court to ... [ildentify any person or persons related
to the child or youth by blood or marriage residing in this state who might serve as licensed foster
parents or temporary custodians and order the Commissioner of the Department of Children and
Families to investigate and report to the court, not later than thirty days after the preliminary hearing,
the appropriateness of placing the child or youth with such relative or relatives . . . .").
116 See, e.g., NAT'L SURVEY OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, No. 15 KINSHIP
CAREGIVERS IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1,
http://www.acfhhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/rb_15_2col.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UGY-HJDY] (noting
that children in kinship care arrangements are more likely to stay with kin caregivers, less likely to be
subjected to repeat maltreatment, and exhibit improved behavioral symptoms).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 21-25 (describing the increased likelihood that people of
color receive referrals for CPS involvement).
"g See supra text accompanying notes 34-37 (describing the ways in which bias can influence the
decision to accept a CPS referrals on black families).
"9 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (describing the higher rate of substantiated CPS
reports against people of color).
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removed when substantiated, 12 0 then the kin options for children of color
are severely limited. Children's extended family members have an
increased probability of suffering the same fate as their immediate family.
Since these children are more likely to grow up in non-kin homes, and face
the associated ills, they too are more likely to enter the system as adults,
and repeat the cycle.
F. The Disproportionality Debate
To be sure, this issue is fraught with a nationalized debate. The most
common counterargument to the notion of implicit bias in the child welfare
system is that if children of color are more often the victims of actual
abuse and/or neglect, then they will naturally be represented at higher rates
in the ensuing child welfare system. However, some studies indicate that
there is no difference in the overall maltreatment rate between black
children and white children.1 2 1 Still others suggest that the maltreatment
rates for black children are actually lower than that of white children.1 22 If
true, such children should be subject to CPS less frequently.
One of the preeminent studies in the field presenting contrasting data is
the National Incidence Study (NIS-4). This study is unique in that it
attempts to identify not only incidences of abuse or neglect that come to
the attention of CPS, but also those incidences that do not come within the
purview of CPS.1 2 3 Its findings "revealed several significant and
statistically marginal differences across the racial/ethnic groups in the
incidence of . . . maltreatment." 2 4 This, however, contradicts the three
previous iterations of the very same study in which no difference in
maltreatment rates between races were found.1 25 The authors attribute the
difference in findings "at least partly [to] . . . the greater precision of the
NIS-4 estimates and partly due to the enlarged gap between black and
120 See supra text accompanying notes 102-04 (describing the increased probability that a black
child substantiated as abused or neglected will enter care, as opposed to his white counterpart).
121 See, e.g, LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 ("[Mlany scholars show that similarly situated Black
families are most severely overrepresented-about three times the rate of White families-at
acceptance for investigation or assessment, despite no evidence to suggest that Black children were
abused more severely than White children.") (internal citations omitted).
22 HILL, supra note 34, at 13-14 (citing ANDREA J. SEDLACK, & DIANE D. BROADHURST, THIRD
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-3) (1996)).
123 ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT (NIS-4), at 2-1 (2010), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default//files/opre//nis4_report exec
summpdfjan20l0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BLQ-G5TP].
124 Id. at 4-22.
121 Sheila D. Ards et al., Racialized Perceptions and Child Neglect, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV.
REV. 1480, 1482 (2012).
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white children in economic well-being."126
However, there may be other factors at play. The NIS-4 takes a unique
approach to identifying those children that do not come to the attention of
CPS by relying on "sentinels"-community professionals who recognized
maltreatment of children that were screened out by CPS without an
investigation.1 27 A difference between the NIS-4 and its predecessors is
that it increased the number of sentinel agencies by three hundred.'28
The NIS uses standard definitions of abuse and neglect and then
applies two, overarching definitional standards: the Harm Standard and the
Endangerment Standard.1 29 The study notes that the Harm Standard's
principal advantage is its strong objectivity because it requires an actual
"act or omission [that] result[s] in demonstrable harm in order to be
classified as abuse or neglect."o This, however, is only as objective as the
agency making the determination that an event results in demonstrable
harm. 3 ' In contrast, the Endangerment Standard "counts children who
were not yet harmed by abuse or neglect if a sentinel thought that the
maltreatment endangered the children or if a CPS investigation
substantiated or indicated their maltreatment."' 3 2 This is not altogether
different from a CPS agency's fundamental charge-to try and determine
whether a report of abuse or neglect is to be substantiated or
unsubstantiated. However, the sentinels have an even more difficult task
since they are attempting to quantify predictive neglect/abuse. This is
notoriously difficult and wholly contingent upon discretion. Moreover, the
sentinel agencies making these assessments are represented by "county
sheriff departments, county departments of juvenile probation, public
health, and public housing, and samples of municipal police departments,
hospitals, shelters, day care centers, schools, other social services and
mental health agencies.""' Many of these agencies suffer from implicit
bias themselves.1 34 If the NIS relies upon entities that suffer the same
26 ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES OF RACE DIFFERENCES IN CHILD
MALTREATMENT RATES IN THE NIS-4, at 1 (2010), http://www.acfhhs.gov/sites/default/files/
/opre/nis4_supp analysis-race-diff mar20l0.pdf[https://perma.cc/SQ6D-K33D].
27 SEDLACK ET AL., supra note 123, at 2-1-2-4. This presents a question beyond the scope of this
Note. If the children in question were screened out by CPS which is governed by, perhaps arbitrarily, a
common definition of abuse/neglect, then why are they considered maltreated by the study?
12n Id. at 2-6.
129 Id. at 3.
130 Id.
"' See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 5 (noting that existing research "confirm[s] that racial bias
plays some role in the decision-making process").
13 SEDLACK ET AL., supra note 123, at 3 (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 2-7.
134 See WALTER S. GILLIAM ET AL., YALE CHILD STUDY CTR., A RESEARCH STUDY BRIEF: Do
EARLY EDUCATOR'S IMPLICIT BIASES REGARDING SEX AND RACE RELATE TO BEHAVIOR
EXPECTATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF PRESCHOOL EXPULSIONS AND SUSPENSIONS? (Sept. 28,
2016), http://ziglercenter.yale.edulpublications/Preschool%20Implicit%/2OBias%/`2OPolicy%/`/`20Brief
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biases to determine whether abuse or neglect occurred, then they do not
add any meaningful data to help make the assessment. They are merely
repeating what a CPS agency does.
This dynamic is consistent with another counter-theory to
disproportionality in the CPS system-visibility. Visibility theory suggests
that children of color are more visible to the CPS system because their low
socioeconomic status ("SES") makes them more likely to be "visible" to a
variety of social service systems like public medical care and public
housing, which results in referrals to CPS.135 The notion of visibility alone
engendering such heady state intervention is troubling in and of itself,
particularly when these entities suffer the same issues related to implicit
bias. 13 6
Another closely related counterargument is the prevalence of
underlying disparities in SES. The theory holds that, since adults of color
are more likely to be of lower SES, their children will naturally be subject
to greater degrees of actual child maltreatment because of the stressors
associated with low SES.D7 If this alone explains the disproportionality,
then it is still problematic and a potential violation of indigents'
fundamental rights just the same.13 8 Another matter to consider is how this
issue exacerbates a child's length of stay in state care. If given a choice, is
a CPS worker more likely to place a maltreated child of color in the home
of his extended family, which is more likely to be financially bereft, or
with a well-off foster family which is statistically more likely to be
white?"' Many of these families, however, are unwilling to take cross-
cultural placements.
-final 9 26 276766 5379.pdf [https://perma.cc/7363-RQGN] (describing the findings of a study
which demonstrate that early education staff observe black children more closely when they expect
challenging behaviors to emerge); LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 6-14 (describing implicit bias
problems prevalent in the education system and the mental health system); PERFORMANCE
EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.3 (reporting that in 2014 a Hispanic child was nearly five times
more likely to be committed delinquent than a white child, and a black child was over thirteen times
more likely to suffer the same fate).
" See, e.g., Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 202 (describing the visibility-bias hypothesis).
3 The National Center for Youth Law argues that understanding disproportionality within the
juvenile justice system is contingent upon examining the "feeder systems" that funnel children into the
juvenile justice system-child welfare, education, and mental health systems. LEE ET AL., supra note
18, at 1. This same concept is evident here. If the entities that funnel children into the CPS system are
infected with implicit bias, then the demographics of the CPS system are sure to be skewed as well.
" See supra note 16 (describing poverty as a precursor to CPS involvement).
3 See infra Part lI.C. (describing the Supreme Court's protection of the indigent in state action
that disparately affects the poor).
139 See supra text accompanying note 126 (describing the growing income gap between white and
black families).
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G. The Social Worker
The information above makes use of data on disproportionate
outcomes in the CPS system to arrive at the conclusion that there is
implicit bias within the system's workforce. However, it says little about
the individual workers who practice. To be sure, CPS work is draining on
many levels. One must be prepared to work long hours, to be saddled with
administrative burdens, and to deal with some of the most horrific scenes
imaginable. Still, there is always room for improvement, and several
studies have looked at employee behavior to study the phenomenon of
implicit bias.
A common teaching tool in the field of social work is the use of
vignettes-a small illustration or account of an event to illicit a response
from a social worker. One study constructed a test utilizing a "messy
house" vignette in which social workers were offered photos of rooms
from actual case files taken by law enforcement during a removal case.' 40
The authors superimposed either no baby, a white baby, or a black baby
into the photo.14' The study concluded that "respondents who see the
vignette with the black baby are more likely to say that the situation meets
the state definition of neglect and/or is a reportable offense according to
state law." 42 The authors added that the "indicators are highly correlated
with the overrepresentation of black children among substantiated
maltreatment cases." 4 3
Another study relied on individuals in King County, Washington, and
included not only CPS workers but also mandated reporters from hospitals,
mental health, public health, schools, and interim care, as well as attorneys,
court officials, and service providers like mental health, and family
preservation specialists.1 4 4 The study attempted to discern the potential for
bias across the key decision points in CPS. 145 It revealed that many
stakeholders were ill-prepared to account for culture or race in their
process of assessing risk or in the family's own approach to child safety. 46
It went on to note that
[T]he evidence is clear that racial bias exists in the
assessment of risk, sending children and families of color
into the child welfare system at a higher rate. The
'
4
oArds et al., supra note 125, at 1483.
141 Id.
142 Id at 1489.
143 d
144 Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 204. Note that these are many of the same stake-holders
relied upon for the NIS-4 "sentinel" cohort. See SEDLACK ET AL., supra note 123, at 2-7 (describing the
demographics of the "sentinel" cohort).
14' Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 205-06.
' Id at 206.
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disproportionate number of children of color in the child
welfare system is reflective of racism that exists in the larger
society. 14 7
Another of the study's key findings was a confirmation of "earlier research
that both attitudinal and structural factors appear to influence outcomes of
decision making." 4 8
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM
The Supreme Court has held that one of the fundamental rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the primacy of family,
while also acknowledging that the definition of "family" has changed over
time.149 Certainly, this "right" does not encompass being completely free
from state intervention, particularly when parental behavior threatens the
health and safety of children. Still, if exposure to a state-run system
increases the probability of disrupting the fundamental right, then the
Court certainly should be casting a more searching eye upon CPS. Indeed,
the Court has repeatedly recognized that termination decrees "work[] a
unique kind of deprivation,"' in which a parent has a "fundamental
interest[] ... in ensuring that the order which terminated all [their] parental
ties was based upon a fair assessment of the facts and the law."isi If this
"assessment" results in entire swaths of the population being represented in
CPS at such a disproportionate rate, then its fairness is in doubt.
This Section makes the argument that, since these fundamental rights
are implicated, the Court should remove the "intent" requirement to
proving the disparate impact of CPS under the Fourteenth Amendment
1' d. at 207.
'
4 1d. at 210. Additional findings were as follows:
1. Subjective factors in the risk assessment processes may open the door for racial
bias in assigning cases for investigation. 2. A lack of culturally specific remedial
services (family preservation, mental health, substance abuse) or differences in
perception regarding the value of these services may result in fewer in-home
services to support the preservation of families of color and could play a role in
differences between in-home placement vs. out-of-home services, and in the filing
of dependencies. 3. Bias against fathers who do not dress consistent with the
dominant court culture and failure to seek fathers or other relatives may increase the
number of children of color remaining in out-of-home care rather than reunifying
with family or kin. 4. A perception that the court process is objective may allow the
bias reported in #3 above to proceed unchecked.
Id. at 212.
"' See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000) (describing the shift in the description of
the "average" American family).
no Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
.' M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 519 U.S. 102, 129 (1996) (Kennedy J., concurring).
2017]1 1047
because it would warrant a strict-scrutiny approach when curtailed in any
other way.15 iH a sense, this is a hybrid Due Process/Equal Protection
argument-there is a fundamental right being curtailed, that has a greater
impact upon a protected class.'53 The Section also makes note of the case
ML.B. v. S.L.J, 154 which, when viewed in the context of some of the SES
counterarguments to disproportionality in CPS, suggests that the Court
may have already set out such protection as it relates to indigency.
A. CPS Involvement Significantly Burdens the Fundamental Right to
Parent
The seeds of a fundamental right to parent were sown in the Supreme
Court's decision in Meyer v. Nebraska."s' The Court, while reluctant to
define the breadth of the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, noted that it at least includes the right to "establish a home
and bring up children."'5 6 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of the
Sisters,'57 the Court limited the state from "unreasonably interfere[ing]
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing . . . of
children.""' The Court added that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."l59 To be sure, this high duty encompasses assurances of
safety, but it also encompasses an implicit promise that the same child will
not languish in state care-if a parent possesses this high duty for the
children in their care, certainly the state does too. The best way a state can
limit children's length of stay in foster care is to find ways to prevent it
from happening in the first place.
This fundamental right was revisited some years later in Prince v.
Massachusetts,"'o where the Court, despite endorsing a state law that
prohibited child labor, still noted that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
152 That is, if the protected class was disparately impacted by something more than implicit bias,
the Court would apply the familiar "strict-scrutiny" approach to evaluating the issue.
' See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015) ("The Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. . . Rights implicit in liberty and rights
secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some
instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.").
' 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
"55 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
16 Id. at 399.
157 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
'5 Id. at 534-35.
' Id. at 535.
'o321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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can neither supply nor hinder."'6 1 The Court added that the family is not
beyond regulation in the public interest, but also noted that there is a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." 62 Indeed, time
and time again, the Court has recognized that "[t]he liberty interest at issue
. . . the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court."'6 3
At minimum, the Court's conclusion suggests that these rights must lay
first with the parent before being relinquished to the state. Taking it a step
further, they suggest that it is only through a parent's omission' 6 4 that the
state can interfere with this liberty interest. At the margins, it is easy to see
where the state should fill these "parental gaps" and intervene-clear cases
involving imminent risk to a child, for example, would be an appropriate
exercise of the state's police power. However, when the state endeavors to
fill gaps that are debatable, or in a gray area, the state begins to encroach
upon this fundamental right. Under such circumstances, a more exacting
review of the state's actions is warranted. Some years later, the Court
would endorse this concept in one of the more influential decisions in the
world of CPS-Santosky v. Kramer.i65
In Santosky, the Court took a procedural approach to protecting the
fundamental right in question. The Court remained steadfast in its
endorsement of the right to parent by ensuring that a burden of proof
greater than a "preponderance of the evidence" was required for a state to
sever this important bond. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
opined that a "'clear and convincing' standard of proof [struck] a fair
balance between the rights of the natural parents and the State's legitimate
concerns" in a termination of parental rights proceeding.' 66 Importantly,
the opinion added that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents."l 67 However, this is
precisely what can happen in a CPS system that is infected with bias-
161 Id. at 166.
162 Id
' Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The Court has frequently
emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been
deemed 'essential . . . .'); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role ... is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.").
"' While an abuse case may be viewed as an "act," in a broader sense it is a failure of the parent
to provide a safe environment.
16' 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
66 Id. at 769.
16 Id at 753.
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particularly in any marginal case. An individual worker, relying on his own
bias, takes on the perception that a parent or guardian is not a "model," and
sets the chain of events in motion. This is confirmation bias in action-
coming to a conclusion and finding facts to support that conclusion, rather
than relying on the facts to reach the outcome. This becomes quite
troubling if this "model" concept is actually a proxy for race.
The Court's language in Troxel v. Granvillei' is particularly pertinent
to the issues that CPS involvement can present. There, the Court addressed
a state statute that permitted any third party to petition the local court for
visitation.16 9 The Supreme Court was troubled, however, by the
infringement on the parent's ability to make decisions for their own
child.170 The Court noted that the practical effect was that the state could
"disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning
visitation . . . based solely on a judge's determination of the child's best
interests.""'
At the outset, CPS determines what a "fit" parent is. Moreover, a
necessary component of the CPS system is that it cannot avoid imposing
certain decisions upon a parent. To be sure, these tend to be in accord with
social norms, but norms change. Indeed, Justice O'Connor was correct in
her assertion that "[t]he demographic changes of the past century make it
difficult to speak of an average American family."'7 2 The same holds true
for styles of parenting, but the state may be slow to respond to these
normative changes, triggering CPS involvement."' This provides ample
opportunity for CPS to infringe and impose the decisions that it, as the
state, thinks best. This becomes very evident in neglect cases-a dirty
home, for example. A CPS worker may be quick to make a judgment
concerning the overall state of a family based purely on the condition of
168 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
169 Id. at 60.
"o See id at 67 (noting that the underlying statute contained "no requirement that a court accord
the parent's decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever").
'
7 Id
1721 Id at 63.
73 See, e.g., Donna St. George, 'Free Range' Parents Cleared in Second Neglect Case after Kids
Walked Alone, WASH. POST (June 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comlocalleducation/free-
range-parents-cleared-in-second-neglect-case-after-children-walked-alone/2015/06/22/82283c24-188c-
I 1e5-bd7f-4611a60dd8e5 story.html [https://perma.cc/FZ9R-HXU6] (describing the national debate
that ensued about parenting choices and government's role in enforcing child protection laws after
parents employed "free-range" style of parenting); see also FREE-RANGE KIDS,
http://www.freerangekids.com [https://permacc/CK5B-WVTG] (last visited Sept. 30, 2016)
(describing the technique); 1-2-3 MAGIC PARENTING, http://www.123magic.com
[https://perma-cc/G9NF-GZ9C] (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (describing a particular disciplinary
technique).
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the home;1 74 but the condition of the home says little of how impacted the
child is by the home. This latter assessment is a more appropriate
measurement that serves to recognize the state's valid interest in the
welfare of the child. In such cases, the imposition upon the fundamental
right is less troubling, but such an assessment requires a broader, more
holistic view, free of implicit bias.
Much of the jurisprudence in the fundamental rights sphere takes on
the perspective of parents, though the Court has often taken on a protective
view of the family in general,'1 75 beyond that of the right to parent.
However, this understanding of the fundamental nature of family should
encompass a child's right as well. While the state does have a "parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,"17
the child has a liberty interest too.1 77 This may take the form of preserving
the bond with their biological parent or it may come in the form of
preserving their right to associate with extended family and not be stuck in
foster care. Indeed, the dissent in Santosky took on the perspective of the
child, and their right to a normal home life: "[a] stable, loving home life is
essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being.""7 For a
child languishing in foster care, however, her home life is anything but
normal. It may well be that some form of separation from her parents is the
only path to a normal home life, but there are more ways to accomplish
this than by severing the parental right. This is particularly true in our
changing society where the concept of family is not what it used to be.
"' See Ards et al., supra note 125, at 1484 (containing two photos from CPS cases used in a
vignette, one of which the average CPS worker would likely construe as "dirty" while the other would
be viewed as marginal).
's See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) ("When a city undertakes
such intrusive regulation of the family . . . the usual judicial deference to the legislature is
inappropriate."); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974) ("This Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause.").
" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
"7 See, e.g., Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (2005) ("The court
finds that the children have fundamental liberty interests at stake in deprivation and TPR [termination
of parental rights] proceedings. These include a child's interest in his own safety, health, and well-
being, as well as an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship
with his biological parents."). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189,
191 (1989) (holding that the state has no constitutional duty to protect a child from the abusive acts of
his father).
178 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("While this court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the
nature of a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds, it seems to
me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in
preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interest, and so, too, must their
interests be balanced in the equation.") (internal citations omitted); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 779 n.8
("This Court has on numerous occasions acknowledged that children are in many circumstances
possessed of constitutionality protected rights and liberties.").
2017]1 1051
While these issues pervade CPS as a general matter whenever bias impedes
sound decision making, it is more troubling when racially motivated
implicit bias is involved. If the same hypothetical child referenced in
Santosky is of color, she is more likely to wait to find a "stable loving
home" than her white counterpart. And when she grows older, her children
are more apt to suffer the same fate.
The argument is not that individuals should be completely free from
state intervention that implicates this fundamental right. It would be
irresponsible to suggest that the state should not intervene in certain
circumstances. Indeed, the state clearly has an interest in regulating such
matters. But that regulation can only go so far. There should be a
recognition that CPS involvement has more impact than merely a social
worker attempting to lend a helping hand. Were this the case, perhaps the
issue would not be as disconcerting. However, those affected by the
decisions of CPS do not always view them as a helping hand.179 This is
particularly true, and rather self-fulfilling, when the system is prone to
implicit bias-it stops looking like a helpful social worker, and more like
undue intervention.
That CPS burdens the fundamental right to parent one's children is
beyond argument. This would not be troubling in the least if the state did
so in a fair and unbiased way. But the chain of events that CPS
involvement sets in motion does not foster unbiased results-the data is
clear on that accord. Given the ills that a CPS system is prone to, as well as
the degree of power it wields, the Court should apply a heightened level of
scrutiny to CPS actions that cut across racial lines. If considering the data
alone, this is an easily answered question. Indeed, the only remaining
barrier is the acceptance of implicit bias as a predicate to the disparate
results.
B. CPS Adversely Affects People of Color and Warrants an Exception to
the Intent Requirement of Disparate Impact Claims When a
Fundamental Right is Involved
It is difficult to argue against a disparate impact upon people of color
in CPS as a construct, given the underlying data. The problem, however, is
whether there is legal redress for what is happening in CPS. To be sure, the
' See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare's Paradox, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 881, 884-
85 (2007) (describing the results of case study conducted in Chicago in which three primary paradoxes
were uncovered: individuals exposed to CPS viewed "caseworkers as both meddling investigators and
appreciated helpers . . . foster parents take care of children [only] for the money, but also that some
need more money to take proper care of their foster children ... [and] protection agencies' pervasive
regulation of their lives, yet reli[ance] on the resources that these agencies provide.").
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legal standard for disparate impact is inconsistent at best.so Still, this
inconsistency has not gone unnoticed by the Court,"s' and perhaps the tide
is turning.
The Court's most famous foray into disparate impact was in
Washington v. Davis.'82 Here, the majority ultimately concluded that a
purpose to discriminate must be present to invalidate an otherwise facially
neutral statute that has a disproportionate impact."' It would be naive to
think that there are not insular examples of CPS workers intentionally
discriminating on the basis of race, such as removing or not removing a
child simply because she is a person of color.'84 However, it is doubtful
that this occurs on a scale grand enough to trigger constitutional disparate
impact claims. The more pressing issue in the CPS world is not purposeful,
but rather, implicit discrimination. Conventional wisdom is that Davis
forecloses such a claim, but in the same opinion, the Court noted,
[A] law's disproportionate impact is [not] irrelevant in cases
involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination.
A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied
so as to invidiously discriminate on the basis of race . . .
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is
true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than
another.' 85
A statutory framework that burdens a particular race twice as heavily
as another should create this inference of discriminatory purpose.' 8 6
Indeed, there have been occasions on which "[t]he Court has accepted
statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in certain limited contexts."8
"o See supra text accompanying notes 8-10 (describing the inconsistency between constitutional
claims of disparate impact which require an intent showing, and those under various federal statutes
under which no such showing of intent is necessary).
"' See supra text accompanying note II (describing Justice Anthony Kennedy's acknowledgment
of this inconsistency).
182 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
's Id. at 239.
* See Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 208 (describing a specific focus group in which a
white social worker indicated that "I look at them [African American parents] to decide if they need
services.") (bracketed language in original).
185 Davis, 436 U.S. at 241-42.
'" See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 359, 374 (1886) (holding that an ordinance
which operated to permit an overwhelming majority of white operators to keep their laundry services,
but denied all but one Chinese operator the same luxury, as evidence that the state acted with
discriminatory purpose).
1' McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987). The Court was referencing Yick Wo and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n.12. In Gomillion, the Court
tackled gerrymandering in the State of Alabama. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. The statute in question
would have transferred the shape of the district from a square, to a twenty-eight sided figure the
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What is more is that this disparity is not only drawn along racial lines, but
it also implicates a fundamental right. Thus, the Court should be even more
willing to relax the intent requirement and evaluate CPS with greater
scrutiny.
The concurrence in Davis supported this notion. Justice Stevens wrote,
"[flrequently, the most probative evidence of intent will be objective
evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the
subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally, the actor is presumed to
have intended the natural consequences of his deeds."" Justice Stevens
went on to "suggest that the line between discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not as critical, as
the reader of the Court's opinion might assume."'8 9 Such is the case when
evaluating gossamery concepts like implicit bias. Finding a bright line in
such an esoteric domain is next to impossible. This, however, should not
dissuade the Court from protecting the interests at stake here, and
extending the special protection the Court has repeatedly afforded them in
other contexts. To recapitulate, the real question is whether this oft
recognized special protection supersedes the intent requirement of
disparate impact analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the Court has not answered this question precisely, it has offered
some guidance on the issue. In ML.B. v. S.L.J, Mississippi conditioned the
appeal of a judicial termination of parental rights decree on the petitioner's
ability to pay for the transcripts of the original proceeding.' 90 The result
was that indigents were affected at greater rates since they could not pay
for transcripts. In invalidating the underlying statute, the Court narrowed
the Davis holding' 9 ' and added "we have repeatedly noticed what sets
parental status termination decrees apart from mine run civil actions, even
from other domestic relations matters such as divorce, paternity, and child
custody . . . [is that] Termination decrees 'wor[k] a unique kind of
deprivation."" 92 Though the Court took note of the underlying policy
concerns in the Davis holding by recognizing that if no intent requirement
effective of which would have removed nearly four hundred African American voters, but not a single
white voter. Id. at 340-41. The Court found this sufficient evidence to constitute claim for a violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 347-48.
188 Washington, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). We certainly prescribe to this concept
in tort law.
189 Id. at 254.
'" M.L.B v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1996).
9 See id. at 126 ("Washington v. Davis, however, does not have the sweeping effect respondents
attribute to it."). Instead, the Court compared the instant case to that of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970), which held unconstitutional an Illinois law neutral on its face, but "in operative effect
expose[d] only indigents to the risk of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum." M.L.B., 519 U.S.
at 126-27 (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 242) (emphasis in original).
192 M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
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for disparate impact analysis were present, then a whole class of laws
would be suspect,193 it still remained on the side of family and protected
the petitioner, despite the lack of intent in the underlying statute.1 9 4 Perhaps
most important, the Court was willing to provide protection to the indigent,
which is not even a protected class. Much like the instant issue, the Court
seemed to recognize that the fundamental right involved is far more
important than the intent requirement.
Like ML.B. and unlike Davis, the policy concerns underlying the
disproportionality debate are about the fundamental right to parent one's
child, not about whether a whole class of laws would be subject to
disparate impact analysis. Indeed, no invalidation of a class of laws is
warranted here. The individual states can, and should, protect their youth.
However, greater protections to limit the invidiousness of implicit bias are
necessary when a fundamental right is involved.
The principal counterargument to the ML.B. v. S.L.J logic would be
that, given the facts of that case, it only applies to the termination of
parental rights proceeding itself, and not necessarily the CPS system as a
whole.195 But the chain of events described in the decision points are a
precursor to the ultimate result of a termination decree. Each decision point
compounds upon the next. What is more is that these deficiencies
propagate on their own accord exponentially, targeting swaths of
communities. This is well illustrated by Dorothy Roberts in The
Community Dimension ofState Child Protection:
Many Black and Native American children grow up in
neighborhoods with a lot of state supervision of children and
families while few white children do. . . . These starkly
disparate neighborhood experiences are surely an important
component of the child welfare system's racial
disproportionality. In other words, racial differences in rates
of foster care placement affect not only children's individual
chances of becoming a ward of the state, but also affect
children's chances of growing up in a neighborhood where
state supervision of children is prevalent. The spatial
concentration of child welfare agency involvement in African
American neighborhoods is what makes the child welfare
system a distinctively different institution for white and
a See id at 126 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 248) ("[A] whole range of tax, welfare, public
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white.").
194 Id. at 128.
'" See Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and
Safe Families Act, 1 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 303, 304 (2006) (arguing that termination of parental rights
raises both due process and equal protection concerns).
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Black children in America.1 96
There can be little doubt that black and Hispanic families have
markedly different experiences with child protection because of the
implicit biases of their CPS workers. This is reflected in the
disproportionality data. To combat this, the Court has to acknowledge the
existence of implicit bias by removing the intent requirement to a disparate
impact claim.' 97 Where a fundamental right is involved, the Court has
already suggested that disparately impacted indigents have a viable
claim.198 Thus, this is only a matter of extending the same protection to a
protected class.
C. The Court Has Recognized a Disparate Impact Claim as to the
Indigent, Without the Requisite Intent Showing Because of the
Fundamental Right to Parent
The disproportionality debate relies upon data to establish the
existence of implicit bias. Admittedly, this is rather attenuated since it is
difficult to pinpoint a causal factor. This, in turn, gives credence to
arguments against the concept-the argument that disproportionality is not
due to implicit bias within the system, but rather, to the underlying factors
like poverty.' 99 From a fundamental rights perspective, however, this
argument is unavailing. While the Court has never expressly provided the
indigent with the status of a protected class, it has spoken out against
"bolt[ing] the door to equal justice."2 00 Moreover, the Court has been apt to
offer such protections when fundamental rights are involved. In a way, this
circumvents the "protected class" issue because the Court can couch the
analysis in Due Process, rather than Equal Protection.
Since the Court has recognized the value of equal justice within a
judicial proceeding, it should also recognize that the state actions that lead
to such judicial proceedings could suffer the same polarity. This is
precisely the landscape of CPS, and their ensuing intrusion into the family.
People of color are overwhelmingly represented in the system, but so too
are the indigent. Under this rubric, it does not matter if the implicit biases
are real and cut across racial lines, or if poverty is the actual culprit-the
Court is more interested in the right itself being infringed upon.
" Dorothy E. Roberts, The Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 23, 31 (2005).
' See Papillon, supra note 10 (arguing that the intent doctrine facilitates implicit bias).
191 ML.B., 519 U.S. at 125-28.
1 See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 ("Some scholars view poverty as the primary factor
accounting for high levels of disproportionality in cases of child maltreatment. ); see also
CANCIAN ET AL., supra note 16.
" Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956).
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In Griffin v. Illinois,20 1 the Court was faced with the question of
whether a state may condition appellate review of a criminal case upon a
defendant's ability to pay for a transcript necessary for appeal.20 2 Finding
such a practice inconsonant with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
aptly noted "the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons
like [indigent] petitioners from invidious discriminations." 203 Responding
to concerns by the dissent that the law in question should be upheld
because, by its terms, it applied to the rich and poor alike, Justice Black
famously proclaimed "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation." 204 This concept underlies the entire gamut
of CPS operations because the intent is never to be disproportionate, but
the results are just that.
While Griffin itself was limited to the criminal context, the protection
of the indigent made its way to the civil arena in Boddie v. Connecticut.205
Here, the Court was dealing with a Connecticut procedure that required the
payment of court fees to initiate a divorce proceeding.206 The effect of this
procedure was that the class of indigent plaintiffs was unable to seek a'
divorce due to their inability to pay the required fees.207 Stuck in dissolving
marriages, the plaintiffs' fundamental rights were impeded because they
could not remarry. The Court responded to this by noting that, "given the
basic position of the marriage relationship . . . due process does prohibit a
State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts
to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages."208 Here,
the Court exhibited a willingness to offer the poor some measure of
protection in part, because of fundamental rights. 209 This is no different
than the CPS issue.
At first glance, it may appear that the Court limited the protection of
the indigent in the CPS context in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services,2 10 where the Court held that the failure to appoint counsel in a
201 Id. at 12.
202 Id. at 13-14.
203 Id at 18. The Court added, "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has." Id at 19.
204 Id at 17 n.11.
205 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
20 6 Id at 372 (1971).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 374.
209 Id at 383 ("Thus we hold only that a State may not, consistent with the obligations imposed on
it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal
relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so."). The
Court has also suggested that a state cannot curtail access to paternity determinations based on
indigence alone. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (upholding as applied challenge to
statute which conditioned blood grouping paternity test upon the party's ability to pay).
210 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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termination of parental rights proceeding did not offend the Constitution.2 1 1
In evaluating the interests at stake, the Court presupposed that the parent's
interests and the state's interests are largely aligned.2 12 This is true in a
global sense because both parties are vested in the well-being of the child.
However, these interests diverge when trying to define what the "well-
being" is, particularly if the state has a problem with implicit bias. This is
even more evident in the marginal case where the state propounds one
standard of "well-being" and the parent describes another. 2 13 The default
rule in such a situation appears to be deference to the state's version of
"well-being," yet for a child languishing in foster care, this is anything but.
Notably, subsequent decisions sharply limited the holding of Lassiter, and
actually defined it in a way that suggests that it stands for the proposition
that an attorney should be appointed for an indigent parent facing a
termination petition.2 14
The notion of protecting the indigent in termination proceedings
culminated in ML.B. v. S.L.J, where the Court was faced with an issue
similar to Griffin-the appeal of a judicial decree on the petitioner's ability
to pay for the transcripts. 2 15 Much like Griffin, the Court noted that
conditioning such a significant appeal upon one's financial status is at the
point where "' [d]ue process and equal protection principles converge. "'216
The Court evaluated the interests at stake and observed that while the state
has a legitimate pecuniary interest,217 "the stakes for petitioner M.L.B.-
forced dissolution of her parent rights-are large, 'more substantial than
mere loss of money. "'218 Ultimately, the Court deemed that the Mississippi
statute violated the Fourteenth amendment.219 Importantly, the Court stuck
to the notion that termination of parental rights are "quasi-criminal in
nature" 220 and thus, conditioning an appeal upon the ability to pay, cannot
survive rationality review. 221 The Court added that the petitioner was
211 Id. at 31-32.
212 See id. at 27 ("Since the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the
parent's interest in an accurate and just decision.").
213 See supra text accompanying note 173 (describing parenting styles which diverge from the
state concept of "appropriate" parenting styles).
2' See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (noting that if the appellant's case were
"sufficiently complex, state-paid counsel, as Lassiter instructs, would be designated for her.").
215 Id. at 106.
216 Id. at 120 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).
2"1 Id. at 122.
218 Id. at 121 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)).
219 See id. at 128 ("[W]e hold that Mississippi may not withhold from M.L.B. 'a record of
sufficient completeness to permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims."').
22o Id. at 124 (quoting Mayer v. City of Chi., 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971)).
221 See id. at 123-24 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956)) (noting that "fee
requirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality," but ultimately "plac[ing] decrees forever
terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not 'bolt the door to equal
justice').
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"endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds,
and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication." 222
In CPS, however, this "branding" applies to more than just a
termination proceeding. It is implicated whenever a parent is placed in the
Central Registry because it limits his ability to provide care for extended
relatives or to seek employment in certain sectors.223 This is not
problematic if the parent actually belongs on the Registry, but if placement
is predicated upon bias, the "branding" is improper. More importantly,
Central Registry decisions can "brand" children, since they can no longer
be placed with individuals on the Registry. 224 This, in turn, increases the
likelihood that children get stuck in foster care.
The indigent (and by proxy, people of color) are at a marked
disadvantage when entering the world of CPS. At the initial stage, their
families are more likely to receive a referral.225 While there are certainly
referrals due to actual mistreatment, others result from a lack of financial
means to meet the needs of their children,226 or are a result of limited
means to address the real issues that led to the referral in the first place. 22 7
In these latter scenarios, the state should buttress the family, not dissolve it.
The Court has already protected the family in the context of termination
decrees that unduly burden the indigent. Even if the observed
disproportionate results in CPS stem from underlying socioeconomic
disparities, and not implicit bias, the Court has determined that state action
that burdens these fundamental rights warrant strict-scrutiny. Thus, CPS
needs to find ways to partner with the community, and resolve the
underlying issues.
III. ADDRESSING IMPLICIT BIAS AND DISPROPORTIONATE RESULTS WITHIN
DCF
The purpose of this Note is not to condemn child protection as an
unconstitutional action by the state. Instead, it is to draw attention to the
problems in CPS and to require the state to resolve the underlying issues.
This problem goes well beyond the scope of CPS alone and requires the
various institutions subject to implicit bias work together to arrive at better
2 22 Id at 125.
223 See supra text accompanying 66-67 (describing these limitations).
224 See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-145-152 (noting that a foster care license shall be denied to
an individual who has ever had an allegation of child abuse or neglect substantiated, the necessary
predicate to Central Registry placement).
225 See CANCIAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 3 (noting that "child maltreatment risk is associated
with various indicators of economic hardship.") (internal citations omitted).
226 See id. at 3 (describing a hypothesis that "poverty may reduce a parent's ability to provide for
a child's most basic necessities.").
227 See id. at 10 (describing the results of an experiment which suggest that increasing the income
of low socio-economic families reduces the risk of child maltreatment).
2017]1 1059
outcomes for people of color. There is no easy solution to this problem,
and it is sure to be costly. But the social implications of ensuring that a
class of children can grow up with their families are certainly worth this
cost. Despite the poor outlook, Connecticut's DCF, and many other CPS
agencies throughout the country, are committed to stamping this problem
out.228 Indeed, many of the initiatives that are currently underway, if fully
embraced, may go a long way toward curbing the issue.
Still, more needs to be done, and at a quicker rate. A recent NCANDS
report indicated that overall maltreatment rates have increased. 22 9 These
numbers may vary as a function of the overall economic health of our
nation, but with a growing lower class,230 there is greater cause for concern
if child maltreatment is viewed as a function of poverty. More pertinent to
this Note is the concern that, as the growing economic divide continues to
skirt racial lines,23 ' the disparate outcomes are sure to be observed at a
greater rate. Though Connecticut's DCF has implemented a number of
changes in practice, the data cited above23 2 is similar to that of prior years
of data.233 The theme of this Section is to find ways to buttress CPS with
additional resources-both financially and with a larger, more skilled work
force. Still, it is vital to recognize that there is no panacea to the problem of
implicit bias in CPS, but accepting it as a problem is certainly the first step.
A. Implicit Bias is a Natural Phenomenon
One might read this Note and draw the conclusion that everyone and
every system is biased. While this may appear alarmist on the surface, it is,
in fact, reality.234 Humans are biased.235 It is a natural phenomenon, 236 and
228 See PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.3 (setting a goal to "[a]chieve racial
justice across the DCF system").
229 See CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 33, at ii (describing a 7.4% increase in reports from
2010 to 2014).
230 See The American Middle Class is Losing Ground, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is-losing-ground
[https://permacc/4AV7-F43T] (noting that the percentage of low-income Americans has increased
from 16% to 20% since 1971).
. 231 See supra text accompanying note 126 (describing the growing economic divide between
children of color and their white counterparts).
232 Supra Section 1.
233 See PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.3 (reporting a lack of meaningful
change in racial disparity statistics between 2014 and 2015).
224 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law ofImplicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 971
(2006) ("[l]mplicit bias as measured by the IAT [implicit association test] has proven extremely
widespread.").
231 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 957 tbl.1 (2006) (detailing statistics on implicit bias against a number of
disadvantaged groups including the elderly, gay people, overweight people, and the indigent).
236 See STAATS ET AL., supra note 4, at 14 (describing implicit bias as an unconscious
phenomenon).
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accepting its existence is critical. Indeed, a number of field and laboratory
experiments exhibit that people discriminate against out-groups even when
randomly assigned to the in-group and based on trivial dimensions.237 This
leads to the hypothesis that the human mind is programed to categorize
people by race. 238 There is some support for this from an evolutionary
standpoint. Writing for the Center for Voluntary Psychology, Robert
Kurzban et al. propose that the encoding of racial differences evolved
because of the nature of early human hunter-gatherers. 23 9 These early
humans would frequently come into conflict with neighboring bands,
and/or form intra-band alliances. 240 Thus, "[t]o negotiate their social world
successfully . . . our ancestors would have benefited by being equipped
with neurocognitive machinery that tracked these shifting alliances." 241
Thus, categorization of out-groups can be viewed as evolutionarily
adaptive. By acknowledging that categorization based on race has a natural
component, the concept of implicit bias is more palatable. Indeed, just
knowing about implicit bias can prompt people to change their behavior.242
There is neurological support for the existence of implicit bias as well.
Studies demonstrate that specific areas of the amygdalae are activated
when subjects feel fear, anxiety, or distrust.243 When coupled with the fact
that many people show a similar reaction to typically African facial
features versus that of typically European facial features,244 a case for the
existence of implicit bias as a neurological construct emerges. The results
can manifest in disparate outcomes from criminal sentencing to treatment
recommendations in the health care settings, 24 5 and child protection. 246 All
237 See Robert Kurzban et al., Can Race Be Erased? Coalitional Computation and Social
Categorization, 98 PNAS 15387, 15387 (2001) (describing studies which exhibit that "people
discriminate against outgroups even when they are assigned to groups temporarily and anonymously by
an experimenter who uses dimensions that are trivial, previously without social significance, and
random with respect to any real characteristics of the individuals assigned") (internal citations omitted).
23. See id (describing "considerable empirical support[] that encountering a new individual
activates three 'primitive' or 'primary' dimensions-race, sex, and age-which the mind encodes in an
automatic and mandatory fashion . . . .") (internal citations omitted). Kurzban et al. go on to propose an
alternative theory that, while sex and age were evolutionarily adaptive categories for humans to encode,
race is not. Id.
23. See id (proposing that race encoding is a "byproduct of adaptations that evolved for an
alternative function .. . detecting coalitions and alliances.").
240 Id
241 id.
242 See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that, while awareness of
implicit bias alone is not sufficient to combat its effects, it is a "crucial starting point that may prompt
individuals to seek out and implement ... strategies").
243 Papillon, supra note 10, at 178 (citing Sergi, 0. Costafreda et al., Predictors ofAmygdala
Activation During the Processing of Emotional Stimuli: A Meta-Analysis of 358 PET andfMRI Studies,
58 BRAIN RES. REVS. 57 (2008)).
24 Id. at 179-80 (citing Jaclyn Ronquilo et al., The Effects of Skin Tone on Race-Related
Amygdala Activity: AnfMRI Investigation, 2 SoC. & COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 39 (2007)).
24 5 Id. at 180-81.
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this is to say that acknowledging the existence of this issue is the first step
towards curbing it.
Child protection is aware of the disproportionality that results from the
manner in which it conducts business. Indeed, it is a phenomenon that has
been observed for over thirty years.24 7 However, agencies could do more to
understand and accept the link between implicit bias and the resultant
disproportionality revealed by the data. The failure to accept this is an
issue that contributes to disproportionate results. If the individual worker
does not know they have a problem, they cannot be expected to resolve it.
This is reflected in service provision, for example. Focus group studies
reveal that "worker attitudes and bias . . . appear[] to play a significant role
in determining the quality of and quantity of services."248 These outcomes
are the results of workers who lack awareness of their own attitudes and
beliefs. 249 The study concluded that "[c]hild welfare professionals need to
be conscious of their underlying bias which increases the importance of
checks and balances." 2 50
The acceptance of this relationship may go beyond that of the
individual CPS agencies to the public at large.2 5 1 For example, when the
CPS agency implements strategies that reduce disproportionate results and
fail, public sentiment is none too accepting. 252 However, these individual
failures should not detract from the overall charge of reducing
disproportionality. The community at large must also be willing to accept
that the conventional way of doing business is no longer viable, and that
new ways of approaching child protection work are necessary in order to
combat disparity. Certainly, the Supreme Court recognizing a disparate
impact claim in this arena would go a long way towards public acceptance.
Indeed, studies exhibit that, when individuals believe there are no
consequences from bias, the systems in the brain least equipped to combat
246 See supra Section 1.
247 Harris & Hackett, supra note 19, at 200.
248 Id. at 208.
249 id.
2
1o ld at 211.
251 See, e.g., id. at 210 ("Disproportionality of children of color in the child welfare system is not
an individual child or family issue but a large social issue.").
252 For example, DCF has recently been promoting an increase in the use of kinship care as a
placement option for children. On the surface, this would be precisely the type of measure that may
help to resolve some of the disparate outcomes that are observed. However, when DCF has failed in
isolated incidents using this approach, public sentiment is harsh. See Josh Kovner, Two DCF Workers
Suspended, Others Face Probe, In Groton Child-Abuse Case, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 2, 2016),
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-dcf-workers-suspended-foster-care-abuse-0903-
20160902-story.html [https://perma.cc/T7M2-S8VM] (describing an extreme case in which a relative
foster parent neglected her foster child, nearly to the point of starvation). While this incident is tragic, it
is also isolated. See NAT'L SURVEY OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, supra note 116 (noting
that children placed in kinship care are less likely to face repeat maltreatment).
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bias, activate.253 Thus, there must be some mechanism in place to
recognize the existence of bias, and institute consequences for that bias.254
That power rests with the Supreme Court.
B. Cross-Cutting Themes in Light of the Existence ofImplicit Bias
There is no single answer to this problem. More importantly, resolving
disparate outcomes resulting from bias goes far beyond changes to the CPS
system. Still, the system can do its part to resolve its contribution to the
disparities that are observed. Regardless of any policy changes, one factor
has always remained true-CPS line staff are overworked. They cannot
keep up with the demands of an old caseload, much less the increased
demands that new initiatives require. This is particularly true since DCF
switched to a DRS model, because a properly executed DRS case requires
a more holistic assessment. However, under current conditions, workers
are forced to apply antiquated techniques in the interest of being as
efficient as possible.255 The problem has an exponential tone to it. As
referrals increase, 56 the ability of a CPS worker to develop a
comprehensive and effective assessment decreases.257 Workers are spread
too thin to seek out the information required and formulate a proper
evaluation. This limits a family's ability to resolve whatever issue brought
them to CPS's attention in the first place because their worker is ill-
prepared to address their individual needs. As a result, the case may close
prematurely, increasing the likelihood of a repeat referral.
More troubling is that the lack of a thorough assessment may result in
unnecessary removals in unwarranted situations, or the failure to remove a
child where such action is necessary. This is because, under pressure, CPS
staff are more likely to make decisions that align with their individual
biases. 258 The solution to this problem must be an increase in the CPS staff
253 Papillon, supra note 10, at 182.
254 See id. at 184 (arguing that the intent doctrine fosters scenarios in which people, justifiably,
believe that their discriminatory acts will remain hidden with no public consequence, resulting in a
neurophysiological reaction least suited to overcome bias).
255 See Heimpel & Bartholet, supra note 41 ("'Front line staffing levels are inadequate given the
complexity of cases that now make up the pool of investigation and ongoing service cases that social
workers have on their caseloads since the implementation of the Differential Response System (DRS),'
the court monitor wrote in the quarterly report released in October. 'DRS results in the diversion of
low-risk cases from workers' caseloads, leaving staff with caseloads made up of only complex
cases."').
256 See CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 33, at ii (describing a 7.4% increase in reports from
2010 to 2014).
257 See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 39, at 4 (describing the relationship between
bias and pressurized decision making).
258 See David M. Amodio, et al., Neural Signals for the Detection of Unintentional Race Bias, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 88, 92 (2004) (noting that "unintended race bias occurs when responses are made
quickly and in the absence of sufficient process resources") (internal citation omitted).
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that services the community. This will allow individual CPS workers to
make less pressurized decisions. Moreover, it would increase the ability to
process decisions with peers, reducing the likelihood of bias. Developing a
comprehensive system of peer review that includes feedback from the
community at large would be critical to evaluating existing and future
practice models.
Developing these coalitions with the community may be the
touchstone of eliminating racially suspect implicit bias. Though theories
abound that racial appearance is encoded by the human brain,259 studies
show that these can easily be broken down. 26 o The key is to find a common
goal that transcends race, and becomes the thing to work towards.2 61 This
may require a conceptual change that values "risk" as much as "safety."
That is, if the risk of removing a child would result in a lengthy stay in
foster care, was weighed against the immediate safety concerns, then
perhaps it would be better to mitigate the safety concerns, rather than
expose the child to the foster care system. In such a change in practice, the
efforts to reduce the immediate safety concerns must be made at all costs.
To be sure, these are often controversial endeavors, but the cost of
maintaining the same child in foster care for years to come is greater. This
will also buy the CPS worker additional time to locate kin resources and
frontload the services to help resolve the problem altogether.
Another vital change would be a data collection system that better
assesses which methods work and which do not.262 As presently
constructed, Connecticut's DCF operates in several regions, each with a
number of offices within the region. 263 This method has the benefit of
promoting pilot programs within any given region for experimentation,
before rolling it out to the entire state.264 The downsides of regionalization
are operational inconsistencies within the state as a whole (differing
259 Supra text accompanying notes 237-41.
260 See Kurzban et al., supra note 237, at 15389 (describing the results of an experiment which
"show[ed] that a new and arbitrary coalition can be encoded just as strongly as race is.").
261 For example, in the study conducted by Kurzban et al., the team was able to create a scenario
whereby the subjects were more apt to encode the color of a person's shirt, than their race. Id at 15389-
-90. The implication is that, by finding a common, transcendent ground that the community and DCF
can rely on, individuals will be less likely to rely on racial categorizations and more likely to categorize
based on this new goal (e.g., those who are seeking the same goal, versus those who are not).
262 Russell, supra note 17, at 112 (arguing that combating disproportionality requires an "accurate,
reliable and valid measurement of not only the incidence of disproportionality, but also the variances in
disproportionality across units, such as courts, jurisdictions, counties, states, years, or decision points is
needed."); see also Ards et al., supra note 125, at 1489 ("Much of the controversy over whether in fact
there is racial disproportionality in actual child maltreatment arises from the differing data used to
establish maltreatment rates by race and ethnicity.") (internal citation omitted).
263 DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, DCF REGIONS AND OFFICES, http://www.ct.gov/dcf/
/cwp/view.asp?a=4182&Q=491744&dcfNa-I [https://perma.cc/6CHH-W4UB] (last visited Nov. 11,
2016).
2" See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 40 (describing the incremental roll out of the DRS system).
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practices between regions) and within the regions themselves (differing
practices between the offices that comprise the region). Balkanization can
undermine credibility when those who are exposed to the same system,
experience vastly different results. This is far more prevalent than
appreciated, particularly in a small state like Connecticut, where moving
from one end to the other is not a difficult proposition. Finding ways to
standardize decision making, and data collection based on that decision
making, will promote a better relationship between DCF and the
surrounding community. The SDM tool is an example that seeks to
accomplish this, but in a way that relies upon old methods of doing
business.265 Standardization is important, but it must be able to encompass
the unique needs of individual families and be particularly sensitive to the
divergent views of CPS between populations.2 66
It is also vital to consider the variable of "time," particularly when
considering decision points. Each of the decision points, and the
administrative burdens attached, take time and compound upon each other.
One of the most prevalent disproportionate results is the amount of time
that minority children languish in foster care compared to the majority. 26 7
Theoretically, the time variable should impact the populations equally,
explicit bias notwithstanding. In spite of this, the results are anything but
equal. 268 Finding methods that can reduce the overall time of a CPS case,
regardless of race, is crucial. Again, this endeavor can only be
accomplished by reducing the overall caseload. Under this scenario, a
caseworker can focus her attention upon families in need on a deeper level,
with a quicker pace. If cases can be resolved without legal intervention, or
by relying upon kin, the overall demands of each case will be reduced.
This affords even more time to focus on the fewer cases in which there are
no kinship resources. Moreover, this deeper attention promotes the
alliances that reduce the prevalence of racial categorization.
Relatedly, another important change would be a concerted effort to
promote staff retention. A seasoned, well-trained staff that is aware of the
natural tendency toward implicit bias would be the ultimate goal. While
Connecticut's DCF is seeking to better train its workforce, it is not
265 See supra text accompanying notes 73-83 (describing the standardized SDM tool and its
deficiencies).
2" See Roberts, supra note 179, at 884-85 (describing paradoxical views on CPS by a particular
community).
267 See supra Section I.E (examining disproportionate length-of-stay results between minority and
non-minority children in foster care).
268 DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 105, at 4 fig.3 (reporting that a black child's
length of stay in care was twenty-nine months, while his white counterparts exited care at around
eighteen months).
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defining staff retention as a primary goal. 26 9 Nationwide, the average CPS
worker stays on the job for less than two years. 270 This impacts
permanency for children because it leads to longer lengths of stay and
multiple placements for children, fewer preventative services for families,
and failed reunifications. 271 Workforce turnover takes a financial toll on the
state in the form of the costs associated with rehiring and re-training new
employees. 27 2 This must be viewed as an issue, rather than the inevitable
result of difficult work. A significant contributor to the high attrition rate is
the impact of secondary trauma.273
Secondary trauma results from repeated exposure to other individual's
traumatic events or stories (e.g., repeatedly hearing tales of child abuse
from a victim), resulting in their own traumatic symptoms. 274 While there
is no clear remedy to this prevalent issue, CPS agencies tend to put the
onus for remedying the effects of secondary trauma on the individual
worker.275 This re-victimizes the worker, and leads to burnout. Instead, the
agency must take some responsibility for this necessary work condition,
and solve the problem administratively. 2 76
The effect of staff-retention would be twofold. First, it will reduce the
time variable since cases would not need to leave the hands of the
departing worker into the hands of either an under-trained, new worker; or
over-burdened, existing worker. Perhaps more importantly, retention will
support the family better because they can then form a relationship with
their worker, offering greater opportunity for the family to buy-in. It may
also help to reduce bias if the worker becomes motivated to protect the
family it has been working with on a deeper level.
Suffice it to say that there are a myriad of changes in technique and
policy that are required to make meaningful changes in the CPS system-
269 See PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, supra note 23, at tbl.5 (listing the goals as: social workers
hired with social work degrees, and supervisors/managers trained in the supervision model).




272 See id (noting that the cost of worker turnover is about a third of the average worker's annual
salary).
273 See ACS-NYU CHILDREN'S TRAUMA INST., ADDRESSING SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS
AMONG CHILD WELFARE STAFF: A PRACTICE BRIEF 2 (2012), http://www.nctsn.org/sites/
/default/files/assets/pdfs/addressingsts amongchildwelfarestaffjpractice brief 0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7T2R-WT4X] (describing a number of studies which support the prevalence of secondary
trauma in child protection).
274 id. at I.
275 Id at 4.
276 Id. Relatedly, the agency must recognize that conventional interventions aimed a reducing
secondary trauma are often perceived by CPS workers as an added burden or "more work." Id. Instead,
the administration must make interventions a feature of the job, so as not to add additional burdens to
an already stressed staff Id
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perhaps too many to list in this Note. Still, all such ideas share a common
thread that is a necessary condition to invoking changes to disparate
outcomes-acknowledgment of the existence of implicit bias and the role
it plays in the disproportional outcomes that ensue. By acknowledging
these issues, and increasing awareness among its professionals, CPS can
work towards equalizing the system, and being viewed as helpers.
CONCLUSION
While the legal redress that people of color have towards remedying
the foster care system is far from clear, one thing is certain-the system
impacts families of different cultures in different ways, and only serves to
perpetuate this dynamic. In order to break this invidious cycle, the
Supreme Court's view on intent as a barrier for redress for implicit bias
must change. It is incumbent upon the Court to require states make
fundamental changes to practice in order to resolve these disparate
outcomes. The only way this can be accomplished is by acknowledging the
fact that intent is not a viable predicate to a disparate impact claim when a
fundamental right is involved. There is simply too much at stake.
While the efforts underway by states, and Connecticut in particular, are
truly promising, they will not reach their full potential under the current
regime. By giving voice to disparate impact liability without intent in this
limited, fundamental context, the philosophical changes that must follow
will be much more palatable for a system so mired in status quo.
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